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PATENT LAW AND THE EMIGRATION OF 
INNOVATION 
Gregory Day & Steven Udick* 
Abstract: Legislators and industry leaders claim that patent strength in the United States 
has declined, causing firms to innovate in foreign countries. Because, however, patent law is 
bound by strict territorial limitations, one cannot strengthen patent protection by innovating 
abroad; as a result, scholarship has largely dismissed the theory that foreign patents have any 
effect on where firms invent. In essence, then, there is a debate pitting industry leaders against 
scholarship about whether firms can use offshore innovation to secure stronger patent rights, 
influencing the rate of innovation. 
To resolve this puzzle, we offer a novel theory of patent rights—which we empirically 
test—to dispel the positions taken by both scholarship and industry leaders. Given that 
technology is generally developed in one country, the innovation process exposes the typical 
inventor to infringement claims only in that jurisdiction. In turn, we demonstrate that inventors 
have powerful, counterintuitive incentives to develop technology where patent rights are 
weaker and enforcement is cheaper. Specifically, it typically costs more to defend a patent 
infringement claim in the United States than to lose one in another country (the cost to litigate 
a patent in the United States averages about $3.5 million and royalty awards have surpassed 
$2.5 billion). Our findings suggest that industry advocates and patent scholars overestimate 
how much innovation strong patent protection generates while underestimating the deterrent 
effect of these high costs of patent enforcement. This empirical research contributes to the 
theoretical understanding of patent rights by shedding new light on this important, yet largely 
dismissed, dimension of where innovation takes place. 
We received invaluable support from international research organizations and patent 
attorneys working for top-tier law firms. Notably, the Global IP Project, a multinational 
research group spearheaded by Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, 
the leading global intellectual property law firm, and Darts-ip, an international 
organization dedicated to the study of global IP litigation, provided proprietary data.  
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This enabled us to explore whether firms optimize value by placing research and innovation in 
countries with “better” patent laws. To verify our models, we interviewed notable patent 
attorneys practicing in the United States, Europe, and Asia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Policymakers and industry leaders are sounding alarms about the 
declining strength of U.S. patent rights, which they claim is eroding 
innovation in the United States. According to the former Director of the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, David Kappos, firms are increasingly 
electing to innovate in Asia instead of the United States, reflecting dismay 
over U.S. patent protection.1 The Wall Street Journal reported that 
American companies are spending greater portions of their research and 
development (R&D) budgets in foreign markets rather than the United 
States.2 Likewise, the former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, 
Maureen Ohlhausen, insisted the United States should return to stronger 
patent protection to prevent the deterioration of U.S. innovation.3 Even 
the Supreme Court of the United States has suggested that U.S. patent 
laws might be hastening the exodus of innovation from the country.4 In 
response, the U.S. Senate debated the STRONGER Patents Act of 2017,5 
as did the U.S. House of Representatives in 2018,6 which would grant 
inventors stronger patent rights as a means of reversing the expatriation 
of innovation.7 
                                                     
1. Nicole Neily, US Is Losing the Innovation War—to China, HILL (Dec. 27, 2016, 4:30 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/311930-us-is-losing-the-innovation-war-to-china 
[https://perma.cc/PR7M-B32W]. 
2. Joe Light, More Companies Plan to Put R&D Overseas, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 22, 2011, 12:01 
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703803904576152543358840066?mg=id-
wsj (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). 
3. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech at the Free Market Forum: Strong 
Patent Rights, Strong Economy (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents 
/public_statements/1264483/ohlhausen_-_hillsdale_speech_10-13-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU7C-VD3F]. 
4. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. 
Ct. 734 (2017) (No. 14-1538); see also Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 
1057, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that the patent eligibility doctrine encourages behaviors that “add 
to the cost and complexity of the patent system and may cause technology research to shift to countries 
where protection is not so difficult or expensive”). 
5. Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth and Economic Resilience Patents 
Act of 2017 (“STRONGER Patents Act of 2017”), S. 1390, 115th Cong. (2017). 
6. H.R. 5340, 115th Cong. (2018); Steve Brachman, STRONGER Patents Act Introduced in House, 
Seeks to Strengthen a Crippled Patent System, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/26/stronger-patents-act-house/id=95188/ 
[https://perma.cc/VUC7-U42A]. 
7. See Brian Pomper, Senators Coons and Cotton Introduce STRONGER Patents Act of 2017, 
IPWATCHDOG (June 21, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/06/21/senators-coons-cotton-
introduce-stronger-patents-act-2017/id=84956/ [https://perma.cc/QXP4-RA2Y] (supporting the 
STRONGER Patents Act by claiming that “weakening of U.S. patent rights has led innovation—and 
the jobs and economic growth that go with it—to increasingly move overseas”). 
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The empirical record might support the alarmists’ claims. Despite the 
United States’ unrivaled capacity to generate innovation—as the home to 
nineteen of the world’s top twenty-five universities,8 most Fortune 500 
companies,9 and one of the top-spending consumer bases10—American 
R&D efforts have fallen outside the top echelon in terms of both 
investment and production, lagging behind countries such as South Korea, 
Israel, Taiwan, and Denmark.11 In other words, the United States is a 
wealthy, educated, and business-friendly country, yet firms are choosing 
to innovate elsewhere.12 Given this evidence, as well as the opinions of 
industry experts, the American patent system may be poorly designed to 
incentivize innovation occurring in the United States.13 
There are, however, excellent reasons to doubt that patent rights have 
any effect on where companies choose to innovate. Principally, an item’s 
location of invention is thought to have little relationship with the patent 
protection it receives. The U.S. patent system—like most other patent 
systems—operates under strict territorial limitations.14 To protect an 
invention from unauthorized use in the United States, one must receive a 
                                                     
8. Best Global Universities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://www.usnews.com/education/best-
global-universities/rankings?int=a27a09 (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). 
9. Jack B. Jacobs, The Reach of State Corporate Law Beyond State Borders: Reflections Upon 
Federalism, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1160 (2009) (explaining that a majority of the Fortune 500 is 
incorporated in Delaware alone). 
10. Country Comparison: GDP (purchasing power parity), INDEX MUNDI, 
https://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=10&v=65 [https://perma.cc/4G6T-JM9C] (listing the 
United States as having the world’s second largest purchasing power parity). 
11. Gross Domestic Spending on R&D, OECD, https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-
on-r-d.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2019); OECD, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY SCOREBOARD: 
BUSINESS R&D INTENSITY ADJUSTED FOR INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE (2013) (on file with author). 
12. See Denis Hughes, The Latest Lure from Abroad for U.S. Firms, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 9, 
2015, 7:34 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-latest-lure-from-abroad-for-u-s-firms-
1447115694?mg=id-wsj (last visited Jan. 26, 2019) (discussing that U.S. firms may be exporting IP 
and research abroad, though for reasons unrelated to patent law).  
13. The latter quality about whether the patent system incentivizes innovation “in the United 
States” has almost uniformly been taken for granted. Most inquiries have sought to determine the U.S. 
patent system’s capacity to incentivize innovation, assuming the innovation will occur in the United 
States. See, e.g., Qin Shi, Patent System Meets New Sciences: Is the Law Responsive to Changing 
Technologies and Industries?, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 317, 318 (2005) (“[D]oes the existing 
United States patent system remain competent to provide incentives for innovation and promote 
industrial application of scientific discoveries?”). 
14. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., 807 F.3d 1283, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We begin 
with the governing law. The Supreme Court has confirmed that the patent laws, like other laws, are 
to be understood against a background presumption against extraterritorial reach.”), reh’g en banc 
denied in part, 805 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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patent from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.15 Because foreign 
patents have no legal effect in the United States, an inventor who would 
like to prevent unauthorized copying in the United States cannot improve 
their patent protection by inventing under the laws of another country.16 
In fact, an inventor must obtain a patent in each country where protection 
is sought, divorcing the strength of one’s patent rights from the country in 
which the device was innovated.17 Because patent protection is unrelated 
to where an inventor creates technology, scholarship has generally 
dismissed the hypothesis that patent law influences the location of 
innovation.18 
In essence, industry is deeply divided from scholarship about whether 
innovative firms seek out jurisdictions offering stronger patent rights, 
thereby affecting the rate of innovation. Scholarship’s current model 
assumes a closed universe wherein a firm’s chief decision is whether to 
increase or decrease its creative activity based on the quality of patent 
protection available within that system. However, if the patent system’s 
efficacy depends upon where firms choose to invent, then scholarship has 
ignored a critical function of patent law. So beyond being an empirical 
puzzle—i.e., whether or not industry experts are correct that increasing 
U.S. patent protection would boost American innovation—it raises an 
important theoretical question about how inventors strategically interact 
with patent incentives in determining not only whether to innovate but in 
which jurisdiction to do so. 
                                                     
15. Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 505, 522 (1997) (providing the law governing the presumption against extraterritoriality in 
the intellectual property context).  
16. Advanced Cartridge Techs., LLC v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-486-T-23TGW, 2010 WL 
3222100, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2010) (stating that foreign patents have no effect in the United 
States). 
17. William Hubbard, The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1909, 1912 
(2013) (“Nevertheless, the incentive effect of U.S. patent law often provides U.S. innovators with 
little advantage over foreign rivals because inventors worldwide can obtain U.S. patents. Indeed, 
because only U.S. patents can be asserted in the United States and because the U.S. economy is the 
largest market in the world, foreign inventors are obtaining U.S. patents in record numbers.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
18. See, e.g., James R. Farrand, Territoriality and Incentives Under the Patent Laws: Overreaching 
Harms U.S. Economic and Technological Interests, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215, 1260–61 (2006) 
(discussing the lack of a relationship between patent strength, the incentivizing effect of patents, and 
the location of innovation: “A timing consideration further undercuts any protection Section 271(f) 
might seem to offer in foreign markets. The incentivizing effects of the patent laws must operate at 
the early inventive and investment stages of innovation if they are to bear any fruit. Possible monetary 
returns, and the need for effective patent protection, in contrast, come years later. Thus, the patent 
laws can incentivize innovation only if meaningful protection appears likely to be available some 
years after the initial inventive efforts and associated investments.”).  
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This Article is one of the first dedicated to the hidden incentives of 
patent law shopping.19 Using data provided to us from the Global IP 
Project20 Darts-ip,21 our analysis explores whether firms optimize value 
by placing R&D and innovation in countries with “better” patent laws. To 
verify our models, we interviewed notable patent attorneys practicing in 
the United States, Europe, and Asia. 
Our hypothesis is that foreign patent environments offer inventors 
meaningful options influencing where they choose to innovate but not in 
the expected ways. We find that inventors are heterogeneous with 
contrasting preferences depending on their stage of innovation.22 
Entrenched patent owners value stronger patent rights—reflected by 
sizeable royalty awards, treble damages, and equitable remedies—to deter 
and punish acts of infringement.23 Inventors during the innovation stage, 
on the other hand, have incentives to develop technology where patent 
rights are weaker. This is because the innovation process exposes the 
typical inventor to liability if the inventor’s R&D has unwittingly (or 
intentionally) incorporated another’s patented technology without 
permission.24 Increasing this issue’s saliency, there are both practicing and 
non-practicing entities that, in asserting meritless patent infringement 
claims, exploit the high costs of U.S. patent litigation; this strategy is 
typically meant to either extract rents from inventors or frustrate efforts to 
develop competing technology, which may lead early stage innovators to 
seek out foreign patent regimes.25 As a partner at an international law firm 
                                                     
19. But see Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can Affect 
Domestic Protections, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 226–27 (2004) (discussing how, in certain instances, 
foreign IP rules could incentivize firms to reverse engineer innovation abroad). 
20. See, e.g., MICHAEL ELMER & STACY LEWIS, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROP., WHERE TO WIN: 
PATENT FRIENDLY COURTS REVEALED (2010), 
http://www.finnegan.com/files/upload/Articles%20and%20other%20Resources%20-
%20PDF%20Files/Managing_Intellectual_Property_Where_to_win_patent_friendly_courts_revealed_09
_10.pdf [https://perma.cc/92XF-V2RR] (providing information about the costs and risks of patent litigation). 
21. About Us, DARTS-IP, http://www.darts-ip.com/ [https://perma.cc/LMR3-QAVP]. 
22. See infra Section II.B (discussing the heterogeneous preferences of patent owners). 
23. Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745, 780 (2011) 
(stating that inventors have interests in, and hope to benefit from, strong patent rights). 
24. See, e.g., Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that 
a company’s use of another’s patented drug during the R&D process was an infringing use). 
25. Maayan Perel, From Non-Practicing Entities (Npes) to Non-Practiced Patents (Npps): A 
Proposal for a Patent Working Requirement, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 756 (2015) (“Critics argue that 
because the patents acquired by NPEs are of low quality, NPEs are nuisances that extract rents from 
those who would rather avoid the expenses of litigation. Meritless infringement lawsuits filed by 
NPEs burden the legal system and increase costs causing manufacturers to invest time and resources 
defending themselves in court. Having less productive resources, manufacturers charge their 
consumers more for purchasing their goods.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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confirmed to us, patent litigation is a common strategy used against 
upstart companies who have “stepped on the toes” of dominant players.26 
Another practitioner witnessed “egregious” examples of large companies 
“steamrolling” smaller inventors using patent litigation.27 Given the 
average cost to defend an infringement lawsuit in the United States is 
roughly $3.5 million28 and royalty awards have surpassed $2.5 billion29—
which inventors can potentially mitigate by innovating almost anywhere 
but the United States—this may explain why the United States has 
reportedly lost innovation. 
Our results generate novel empirical and theoretical insights into the 
way patent rights incentivize innovation. According to our quantitative 
analysis, some firms avoid the litigation risks of U.S. patent law by 
developing technology in countries that have lessened the costs and risks 
of patent enforcement (i.e., all the costs borne from the patent assertion 
and litigation processes).30 We deduce, then, that a critical and generally 
ignored element of patent law’s ability to promote innovation concerns 
where the resulting innovation takes place. It seems industry advocates 
and patent scholars overestimate how much innovation strong patent 
protection generates, while underestimating the deterrent effect of the 
high costs associated with patent enforcement. So, contrary to popular 
logic, recent congressional efforts, and industry advocates,31 our findings 
indicate that the increasingly common proposal to strengthen patent rights 
would have the opposite effect of diminishing innovation in the United 
States. 
Based upon these findings, we identify strategies to reform procedural 
and substantive aspects of U.S. patent law to make the United States a 
more attractive venue in which to invent.32 Specifically, we argue in favor 
of expanding the experimental use exception and the enactment of a more 
efficient staging process to litigate infringement claims. By modestly 
                                                     
26. Telephone Interview with a Partner in an Asian office of an international law firm (Jan. 23, 2018). 
27. Email Interview with an Of Counsel in the Tokyo office of an international law firm (Jan. 18, 2018). 
28. See infra Section III.A (providing an analysis of the cost to defend a patent infringement lawsuit 
in the United States). 
29. Debra Cassens Weiss, $2.5B Verdict Is Largest Patent Infringement Award in US History; Will 
Award Be Tripled?, ABA J. (Dec. 19, 2016, 10:36 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/2.5b_verdict_is_largest_patent_infringement_award_in_us
_history_will_award [https://perma.cc/5KXF-4GNC]. 
30. See infra Part IV. 
31. See, e.g., Charles Sauer, The Bipartisan Stronger Patents Act Will Protect America’s Perpetual 
Motion Machine: Innovation, WASH. EXAMINER (June 21, 2017, 10:40 AM), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-bipartisan-stronger-patents-act-will-protect-americas-
perpetual-motion-machine-innovation/article/2626618 [https://perma.cc/PEB7-F3DV]. 
32. See infra Part V. 
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reforming existing institutions, the costs and risks of patent enforcement 
can be abated without harming patent protection. These measures should 
help the U.S. patent system to incentivize innovation relative to more cost-
effective international patent laws. 
This Article is organized into five parts. Part I describes the patent 
system’s purpose of fostering innovation and economic growth, giving 
special attention to the debate over optimal patent strength. Part II 
discusses the reasons why U.S patent law is seldom thought to influence 
where firms innovate. It then rebuts this orthodoxy by explaining that 
upstart inventors encounter powerful incentives to place their R&D 
programs in jurisdictions with weaker patent rights, effectively exporting 
the most socially valuable aspects of the innovation process. Part III 
discusses the determinants of innovation on a more granular level, 
exploring the comparative costs of (1) litigating a patent claim, (2) losing 
the lawsuit, and (3) inventing within a patent thicket. Then, Part IV 
empirically examines the extent to which companies value patent laws 
when deciding where to innovate, using a dataset constructed with, and in 
consultation with, data provided by the Global IP Project and Darts-ip. 
The results offer new insights into the inner mechanics of patent law and 
the strategic behaviors of innovative firms. Part V uses these empirical 
findings to suggest policy reforms to procedural and substantive aspects 
of patent enforcement, including the expansion of the experimental use 
exception and the creation of a more efficient staging process to patent 
enforcement. 
I. R&D, INNOVATION, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM 
A primary catalyst of economic growth is innovation, which the patent 
system is meant to promote. Scholars disagree, however, about the 
optimal strength of patent protection to achieve this goal. On one hand, 
stronger patent rights are commonly thought to best reward and 
incentivize innovation, but on the other hand, strengthening patent 
protection beyond a certain point could overly burden competition and, as 
a result, invention. This debate about patent strength illustrates the 
importance of innovation as well as properly calibrating the patent system 
to achieve this end. 
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A. The Economic Theory of Patent Rights, Innovation, and Economic 
Growth 
Backed by a near-unanimous chorus of economists who characterize 
innovation33 as the primary determinant of development, most nations 
prioritize innovation.34 A recent report by the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) stated as much, remarking “[i]t 
is taken as axiomatic that innovative activity has been the single, most 
important component of long-term economic growth.”35 Robert Solow’s 
seminal research, for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize, found that a 
country’s rate of economic growth is determined by the productivity of its 
labor and capital, both of which are enhanced by innovation.36 
                                                     
33. Innovation lacks a universally accepted definition, existing on more of an “I know it when I see 
it” basis. For the scholars who have tried, the following are some of the results. Doris Estelle Long, 
Crossing the Innovation Divide, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 507, 510–11 (2008) (“Like every good watchword, 
‘innovation’ has no precise meaning. It has been defined as everything from ‘introducing something 
new’ to ‘a scientific approach for finding newer better ideas and solutions to problems, which make 
life easier and simpler to live.’ In the arena of economics, Joseph Schumpeter defined innovation as 
‘[t]he introduction of a new good . . . a new method of production . . . [t]he opening of a new 
market . . . [t]he conquest of a new source of supply . . . [and] [t]he carrying out of the new 
organisation of any industry.’ A report by the Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation of 
the U.N. Millennium Project similarly emphasizes the entrepreneurial foundations of innovation and 
its critical role in helping transform countries from reliance on the exploitation of natural resources 
to technological innovation as a basis for development. This emphasis on technology and 
entrepreneurship is reflected in the Oslo Manual on Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting 
Innovation Data (“Oslo Manual”) produced by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development. The Oslo Manual defines innovation as ‘the implementation of a new or significantly 
improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational 
method in business practices, workplace organisation or external relations.’” (alteration in original) 
(footnotes omitted)); see also David McGowan, Innovation and Liability for Contributory Copyright 
Infringement, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 38, 41 (2009) (“An innovation is a change in the status 
quo that (i) allows one to do something one could not do before or (ii) allows one to do something 
already possible while using fewer resources than were required before.”). In contrast, “research and 
development” tends to refer to the creatives activities and programs undertaken by companies and 
inventors to create innovation. 
34. See, e.g., Innovation Union, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-
union/index_en.cfm [https://perma.cc/96QE-DBE5] (detailing the European Commission’s efforts to 
bolster innovation in Europe); OECD, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: RATIONALE FOR AN INNOVATION 
STRATEGY 7–9 (2007), https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/39374789.pdf [htts://perma.cc/WEE4-EK8A] 
(describing efforts among developed and developing countries to promote innovation); WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT 9 (2015) [hereinafter WIPO 
REPORT], https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_944_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
FWX2-82SW] (detailing the litany of positive externalities derived from innovation). 
35. NATHAN ROSENBERG, OECD, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2004), 
https://www.oecd.org/cfe/tourism/34267902.pdf [https://perma.cc/53DG-CT28]. 
36. Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. 
& STAT. 312, 320 (1957) (attributing increases in labor productivity to “technical change”); see also 
Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition, and the 
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In fact, R&D’s importance extends beyond the goods it produces, 
triggering local and systemic benefits, known as “spillover effects,” from 
the activity itself.37 For example, the sophisticated nature of innovation 
creates demand for well-educated and highly skilled labor.38 In addition, 
local populations working for innovative firms receive training and 
experience, which increases human capital and boosts society’s capacity 
to establish increasingly advanced technology companies.39 And because 
such activities require capital, programs that promote innovation tend to 
generate investment.40 Scholars agree that policy must promote R&D and, 
just as importantly, avoid incentivizing local firms to innovate abroad.41 
Innovation may, however, struggle to blossom in a vacuum, as it often 
needs a patent system.42 Without patent protection, the market would offer 
inadequate incentives to innovate because free-riders could copy 
another’s original device, thereby avoiding the costs of inventing it.43 
Since a free-rider may then undersell the inventor, the difficulty of 
profiting from one’s R&D investment would stifle innovation. To prevent 
                                                     
Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 349 (2013); Kristian 
Uppenberg, Innovation and Economic Growth, in 14 EIB PAPERS: R&D AND THE FINANCING OF 
INNOVATION IN EUROPE 10, 13 (Hubert Strauss ed., 2009), 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/efs/eibpapers/eibpapers_2009_v14_n01_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2 
44A-L6JG] (“Output (Y) is a function of fixed capital (K), labour (L) and ‘knowledge’ (A). In 
essence, what this function says is that aggregate output can be expanded either by increasing the 
amount of labour or fixed capital used in production, or through an expansion of the stock of 
knowledge.”). 
37. Graetz & Doud, supra note 36, at 361 (describing the nature and benefits of R&D’s spillover effects). 
38. See generally Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of 
Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789 (2015). 
39. WIPO REPORT, supra note 34 at 10. 
40. Id. at 9 (“Firms invest in new capital equipment based on the future income they expect those 
investments to generate. The introduction of new technologies can raise investment returns and lead 
firms to undertake new investments. Historically, the introduction of major breakthrough technologies 
has often unleashed investment booms, driving expansions in economic output.”). 
41. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at 
the Conference on “New Building Blocks for Jobs and Economic Growth” (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110516a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WNJ9-6N76] (discussing the important role of promoting R&D through 
government policy); Graetz & Doud, supra note 36, at 349–50 (noting that R&D is underproduced 
without government policy, and that public returns from R&D can be multiple times greater than 
private returns). 
42. See Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation, 
56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (2003) (outlining the logic of innovation and intellectual property). 
43. Richard S. Gruner, Better Living Through Software: Promoting Information Processing 
Advances Through Patent Incentives, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 977, 1001 (2000) (“The potential threat 
of ‘free riders’ may deter innovative efforts for a number of reasons. First, innovators might not want 
to incur large research expenses where there is no guarantee that they will have a chance to recover 
those expenses out of profits from exclusive opportunities to market the resulting products.”). 
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the free-rider problem, Congress exercised its constitutional authority to 
enact the Patent Act,44 granting inventors the exclusive right to exclude 
others from exploiting their new, useful, and non-obvious creations.45 A 
related utility of the patent system is to entice inventors with the reward 
of monopoly rights and monopoly profits.46 In exchange, inventors must 
disclose their technology to the public, contributing to innovation as a 
whole and progressing the sciences.47 Thus, the patent system should 
ideally encourage actors to invest a greater sum of resources in innovation 
than would naturally occur. 
B. Patent Strength Questions 
Having decided to enact a patent system, the next question concerns 
the optimal strength of patent rights. Patent strength refers to the degree 
of control that patentees enjoy to use and license—or not to use and 
                                                     
44. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”); Quanta Comput., 
Inc. v. LG Elects., 553 U.S. 617, 626 (2007). 
45. See Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The right to exclude 
others from a specific market, no matter how large or small that market, is an essential element of the 
patent right.”); Amelia S. Rinehart, Patents as Escalators, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 81, 88 (2011) 
(“[P]atent owners obtain the right to exclude others from practicing the invention, which provides the 
ability, in many cases, to exceed free-market levels of private return.”). 
46. Renata B. Hesse, Remarks from the 5th Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum - Antitrust: 
Helping Drive the Innovation Economy, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2016) (“Patents, once obtained, 
can confer a type of market (or monopoly) power on the patent holder for the length of the exclusivity 
period. We are okay with that, and allow patent holders to earn those profits, because we want to 
reward the investment and the ingenuity that goes into creating the patented invention and encourage 
the innovations that can now be built on top of it. What we do not do is take away those monopoly 
profits if earned lawfully.”). 
47. The U.S. patent system’s requirements of enablement and written description serve to ensure 
the inventor has met their half of the agreement, and ensure the invention is disclosed so that others 
may practice the patent without undue experimentation. Incentivizing this behavior brings inventions 
to the rest of the innovative community to build upon, instead of locked tight in a safe, never to see 
the light of day. See Kali Murray, Constitutional Patent Law: Principles and Institutions, 93 NEB. L. 
REV. 901, 920 (2015) (“This insight is not particularly different from the previous characterizations 
of the patent bargain, but Robinson refined the metaphor of the patent bargain by stressing that the 
patent holder had a duty to disclose the full content of the patented invention through the specification 
and the claims. Robinson, thus, centered his theory on the obligation of the patent holder.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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license48—their inventions.49 Although the reward of stronger patent 
rights can increase the incentives to innovate, a chief concern is that too 
much exclusion hinders competition and, in some instances, innovation.50 
The optimal balance between competition and innovation has generated a 
vibrant debate about the policy choices made in granting patent rights.51 
Stronger patent protection is thought to foster innovation by increasing 
the profits an inventor may receive from developing patentable 
technology.52 Because infringement chips away at the patentee’s revenue, 
remedies conferred by stronger patent rights tend to impose significant 
costs on infringers to compensate the patentee for infringing uses, protect 
the government-granted monopoly, and deter future unauthorized acts.53 
Notably, the U.S. Patent Act may remedy instances of infringement with 
monetary awards that far exceed the patentee’s actual damages as a means 
of punishing the infringing party.54 The grant of stronger patent rights is 
therefore designed to incentivize innovation by not only reducing the rate 
                                                     
48. Dana W. Hayter, When a License Is Worse than a Refusal: A Comparative Competitive Effects 
Standard to Judge Restrictions in Intellectual Property Licenses, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 281, 301 
(1996) (stating that patent holders have no duty to actually use or market their inventions to enforce 
the patent); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Movement of Technology, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1119, 1141 (2012) (“The same rules largely apply to intellectual property rights. As a general 
proposition, the owner of a patent or copyright has no duty to license it to a rival or anyone else.”). 
49. Although there is no universal definition or measure of strong patent rights, this concept 
generally refers to the degree to which the patentee may prevent unauthorized use. See Sarah R. 
Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733, 778 (2012) (citing 
Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes, 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 985 (W.D. Tenn. 2006), for the proposition 
that “the public interest is considered to favor a strong patent system with the strong remedy of an 
injunction to support it”). 
50. See infra Section III.B (discussing hyper compensatory remedies available under U.S. patent law). 
51. See, e.g., Deming Liu, Now the Wolf Has Indeed Come—Perspective on the Patent Protection 
of Biotechnology Inventions in China, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 207, 236 (2005) (discussing two policy 
considerations: the experimental use exception and compulsory licensing of patents). 
52. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 
61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 702 (2014) (discussing the benefits of strong patent rights to innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry). 
53. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND 
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 23 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-
trade/110307patentreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM6F-9D84] (stating patents are meant to deter 
infringement and promote innovation). 
54. See Gregory Day, Competition and Piracy, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 775, 778 (2017) 
(presenting instances in which courts awarded patent and copyright holders damages that exceeded 
the actual damages suffered). 
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of infringement but also increasing the profits an inventor may derive 
from another’s infringing use.55 
On the other hand, stronger patent rights might frustrate innovation by 
overly excluding competition.56 Each patent increases the 
“anticommons,” which refers to areas of industry the public may not use.57 
For example, a patented drug is part of the anticommons because others 
cannot make, use, or sell the drug without the patentee’s permission. The 
problem is that the most significant forms of innovation tend to be 
cumulative58 in that many inventions incorporate, or even require, pre-
existing patented technologies.59 Bluetooth, for instance, relies on the 
inventions of over 30,000 patent holders.60 The multilayering of patents 
allows entrenched inventors to obstruct downstream innovation by 
refusing to license a critical patent or creating a “hold up” situation 
whereby the fee charged to license the blocking patent is elevated to an 
extortionary level.61 In turn, stronger patent rights may impede 
downstream innovation if patentees impose overwhelming costs on 
inventors endeavoring to build off earlier works.62 
                                                     
55. See John Dubiansky, The Role of Patents in Fostering Open Innovation, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
1, 28 (2006) (stating that strong patent rights increases innovation because patent holders receive 
greater assurance that they may use their patented inventions without having their rights infringed). 
56. Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
637, 645 (2011) (explaining that strong patent rights impede downstream innovation by blocking 
competition). 
57. See, e.g., Matthew Poulsen, Jurisprudential and Economic Justifications for Gene Sequence 
Patents, 90 NEB. L. REV. 196, 199 (2011) (explaining the tragedy of the anticommons). 
58. Gaia Bernstein, Incentivizing the Ordinary User, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1275, 1315 (2014) 
(describing the effects of strong patent rights on the barriers to innovation); see also Dan L. Burk & 
Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1619–20 (2003) (“The theory 
of cumulative innovation starts by rejecting the proposition that invention is an activity engaged in by 
a single inventor or company acting in isolation. Rather, cumulative innovation is an ongoing, 
iterative process that requires the contributions of many different inventors, each building on the work 
of others.”). 
59. See Courtney C. Scala, Making the Jump from Gene Pools to Patent Pools: How Patent Pools 
Can Facilitate the Development of Pharmacogenomics, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1631, 1641 (2009). 
60. Evan Engstrom, So How Many Patents Are in a Smartphone?, ENGINE (Jan. 19, 2017), 
http://www.engine.is/news/category/so-how-many-patents-are-in-a-smartphone 
[https://perma.cc/PC56-BFAX]. 
61. James Boyle, Open Source Innovation, Patent Injunctions, and the Public Interest, 11 DUKE L. 
& TECH. REV., 30, 32–33 (2012) (discussing how the nature of a patent hold up enables the patent 
holder to extract above-market rents); see also Scala, supra note 59, at 1641 (explaining the 
proliferation of patents resulting in an “anticommon” which impedes downstream innovation). 
62. See Bryan J. Cannon, The Travesty of Patent Opinion Use: Advancing the AIA to Fix the 
Misguided Patent Infringement Enhanced Damages Framework, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 439, 466 
(2015) (explaining an instance in which the costs of infringement may deter infringement). 
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Since scholars describe patent rights as a tradeoff between encouraging 
innovation and impeding competition,63 the U.S. Patent Act must balance 
the rights of inventors against their competitors.64 Although stronger 
protection might seem to benefit patentees and innovation, it could also 
exclude the types of competition that lead to efficient markets, reflected 
by the market’s ability to generate competitively priced, innovative 
goods.65 
It is important to recognize that the debate about optimal patent strength 
tends to view the patent system’s efficacy as a function of how much 
innovation it incentivizes—e.g., a higher price to invent is likely to cause 
parties to spend fewer resources on innovation.66 As one commentator 
explained this orthodoxy, “increases in the level of patent protection have 
two primary effects: they increase the incentives for innovators to 
innovate due to the potential for greater supracompetitive profits (thus 
increasing innovation activity) and simultaneously reduce incentives to 
innovate due to the grant of greater exclusive rights to others . . . .”67 But 
perhaps firms have another option: instead of restricting their innovative 
output, they could invent under the patent laws of countries offering more 
desirable patent environments. The next Part discusses the reasons that 
few scholars have considered foreign patent environments to entail a 
                                                     
63. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of 
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1500 (2002) (“Patent policy embodies a tradeoff between 
dynamic and static efficiency. On the one hand, if innovations can be freely copied, innovators will 
have no way of appropriating any of the gains they generate, nor of recovering the costs they have 
incurred in research and development. On the other hand, however, the prices of the innovations 
would be low, and every consumer who values the product at more than its cost would be able to 
purchase it. In the absence of patents, then, there would be essentially no static deadweight loss, but 
society would incur serious dynamic inefficiencies by eliminating much of the incentive to 
innovate.”). 
64. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (“The Patent Clause 
itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies 
which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”). 
65. Id. 
66. See, e.g., Dennis D. Crouch, Nil: The Value of Patents in a Major Crisis Such as Influenza 
Pandemic, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1133 (2009) (“Patent law operates under the assumption 
that the promise of strong patent rights provides an incentive to innovate. If the law offers weaker 
rights, a potential innovator will presumably feel marginally less inclined to pursue the innovation.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
67. Gregory N. Mandel, Leveraging the International Economy of Intellectual Property, 75 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 733, 747 (2014) (stating further that “[s]tarting from a point of no patent protection, so long 
as the marginal benefit of greater incentives outweighs the marginal cost of greater exclusion, 
increasing patent protection will increase incentives to innovate overall. As patent rights increase, 
however, the marginal benefit of increased incentives will tend to get smaller due to decreasing returns 
to scale, while the marginal cost of exclusionary rights will tend to increase due to the increased 
transaction costs of the network effects of greater exclusivity. As a result, the relationship between a 
given level of patent protection and the corresponding net incentives or value of innovation produced 
by that level of propertization will have an inverted-U form” (footnotes omitted)). 
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meaningful alternative and why the United States should rethink this 
orthodoxy. The U.S. patent system might, in fact, poorly incentivize 
innovation within the United States. 
II. THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM AND THE DECISION OF 
WHERE TO INNOVATE 
Scholarship has seldom explored whether the patent system influences 
the rate of innovation by affecting where innovation occurs—and for good 
reason. Because U.S. patent law is the exclusive source of patent 
protection in the United States, inventors cannot strengthen those 
exclusionary rights by innovating abroad. But as will be explained, 
powerful incentives nudge firms to offshore their innovation programs to 
jurisdictions offering certain types of patent environments and not others. 
The key lies in the conflicting preferences dividing upstart innovators 
from entrenched patent holders. Our theory—supported by interviews 
with notable patent attorneys as well as our empirical analysis in 
Part IV—indicates that the U.S. patent system is poorly constructed to 
generate innovation in the United States. 
A. Patent Law’s Territorial Limitation 
In theory, patent laws should rarely affect where inventors develop 
technology because the strength of an item’s patent protection is unrelated 
to where it was invented. If an inventor would like to sell patentable 
technology in the United States, the inventor cannot acquire additional or 
stronger patent rights by inventing in another country.68 This is because 
the presumption against extraterritoriality limits the reach of most U.S. 
patent laws to the United States’ sovereign borders, and likewise, foreign 
patent laws have no effect in the United States.69 So regardless of whether 
the patented item was researched or manufactured domestically or abroad, 
the exclusive source of patent protection in the United States is the U.S. 
Patent Act.70 Additionally, because an inventor who would like to deter 
infringement in the United States is limited to the remedies available 
                                                     
68. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Should Foreign Patent Law Matter?, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 581 
(2012) (discussing the effects of foreign patents in the United States). 
69. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007) (“The presumption that United States 
law governs domestically but does not rule the world applies with particular force in patent law. The 
traditional understanding that our patent law ‘operate[s] only domestically and d[oes] not extend to 
foreign activities,’ is embedded in the Patent Act itself, which provides that a patent confers exclusive 
rights in an invention within the United States.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
70. Id.  
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under U.S. patent law, the strength of foreign patent laws is thought to 
have very little, or no, effect upon where inventors choose to develop 
patentable technology.71 
For the same reasons, an American-based inventor who would like 
patent protection in another country must obtain an individual patent in 
that country. The U.S. Supreme Court explained this principle in 
Microsoft v. AT&T Corp.,72 stating “[f]oreign conduct is generally the 
domain of foreign law, and in the patent area, that law may embody 
different policy judgments about the relative rights of inventors, 
competitors, and the public.”73 As applied to Microsoft, the Court held 
that foreign patent laws govern the unauthorized use of goods overseas: 
“If AT&T desires to prevent copying abroad, its remedy lies in obtaining 
and enforcing foreign patents.”74 An American inventor who would like 
to protect their invention in France, for example, must do so via the French 
patent system.75 This further unmoors the strength of patent rights from 
the location of innovation since an inventor must obtain a patent in 
whichever countries protection is sought. Unfavorable aspects of U.S. 
patent protection, or any patent scheme for that matter, should have little 
influence upon where a firm invents because one’s patent protection 
remains the same despite the technology’s location of development. 
B. Patent Incentives to Research and Develop (Elsewhere) 
Despite the fact that patent schemes should have little influence upon 
where a firm invents, this Article argues that patent laws affect where 
                                                     
71. Id.; see, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Proxy Signals: Capturing Private Information for Public 
Benefit, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 57 (2012) (“A society that is a heavy net producer of innovation, 
which can be commercialized extraterritorially, will not favor artificially high domestic intellectual 
property protection because intellectual property laws are national. Having stronger United States 
patent law will not help American industry profit from foreign innovation sales because the ability to 
profit from innovation overseas largely depends on foreign countries’ intellectual property laws, not 
domestic laws. This circumstance may (and apparently does) cause domestic industry to advocate for 
stronger patent protection abroad, but not domestically.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)). 
72. 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
73. Id. at 439. 
74. Id. (emphasis added). 
75. Protecting Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Overseas, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/international-protection/protecting-intellectual-
property-rights-ipr [https://perma.cc/RYW4-UBS9] (“Since the rights granted by a U.S. patent extend 
only throughout the territory of the United States and have no effect in a foreign country, an inventor 
who wishes patent protection in other countries must apply for a patent in each of the other countries 
or in regional patent offices. Almost every country has its own patent law, and a person desiring a 
patent in a particular country must make an application for patent in that country, in accordance with 
the requirements of that country.”). 
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firms physically research and produce goods before technology becomes 
marketable. Due to the territorial limitations of patent law, inventors are 
subject to claims of infringement in the countries they have made, used, 
or sold infringing products.76 Since technology is generally developed in 
one country, the innovation process exposes the typical inventor to 
infringement claims only in that country. For example, an inventor in the 
innovation stage whose entire R&D process exists in the United States 
can be sued for infringement in, and only in, the United States before a 
single sale is made.77 As a result, firms subject their innovation and R&D 
programs to risk—both in terms of royalty damages and potential 
injunctive relief—in the countries they research, test, and develop 
patented methods and devices. 
The territorial limitations on exposure to litigation and infringement 
liability encourage inventors to prefer disparate patent systems depending 
upon their stage of innovation. Although most patentees desire 
meaningful patent protection, dominant firms—which tend to possess 
market power and entrenched patents—are likely to prefer stronger patent 
rights and laws that remedy acts of infringement with hyper-
compensatory and punitive remedies.78 By raising the costs of 
infringement, stronger patent rights help entrenched firms to deter 
potential infringers from threatening their market power. 
In fact, a dominant firm can preserve or increase its market power by 
using its patent portfolio to wage patent litigation against smaller 
competitors.79 Because patent litigants tend to incur significant costs even 
if they prevail at trial,80 entrenched firms, which are more capable of 
spending three million dollars on litigation, may threaten patent 
infringement against less-resourced firms as a means of imperiling their 
ability to innovate or redirecting their research efforts away from the 
                                                     
76. See supra Section II.A. 
77. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells 
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented 
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” (emphases added)). But see id. 
§ 271(e)(1) (Safe Harbor Provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act).  
78. See Mandel, supra note 71, at 21 (suggesting that dominant patentees who may extract 
monopoly profits are likely to advocate for strong patent rights).  
79. See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-can-stifle-
competition.html [https://perma.cc/PZ2Y-D33N] [hereinafter The Patent, Used as a Sword] 
(providing the example of a company that was unable to innovate due to an infringement lawsuit 
allegedly initiated to impede the company’s innovation). 
80. Jonathan L. Moore, Particularizing Patent Pleading: Pleading Patent Infringement in a Post-
Twombly World, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 451, 459 (2010). 
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patentee’s market.81 Indeed, nearly every scholar interviewed for this 
Article remarked that the rise of frivolous patent litigation harms 
American business and innovation. As a consequence, the rewards of 
maintaining market dominance have shown to incentivize U.S. patent 
holders to exploit the costs of patent litigation, even with meritless 
lawsuits.82 
On the other hand, given that upstart inventors are more likely to defend 
an infringement lawsuit than to initiate one, they prefer patent laws that 
minimize the costs of patent enforcement and litigation.83 As previously 
stated, a dominant firm’s ability to initiate a lawsuit against an upstart’s 
R&D program—even if no actual infringement has occurred—depends 
upon the patent system in which the upstart has chosen to invent. To 
mitigate these risks, we argue that inventors in the R&D stage have 
incentives to stash their innovation and creative processes in countries that 
make defending an infringement lawsuit cheap and expeditious, forsaking 
countries with stronger patent rights such as the United States. After all, 
it typically costs more to litigate an infringement claim in the United 
States than to lose one in any other country.84 
This framework might render U.S. firms less competitive than foreign 
firms in the global marketplace.85 Consider a U.S. company that innovates 
and manufactures in the United States but sells abroad. If the U.S. 
company competes against foreign firms that entirely manufacture and 
invent abroad, then only the U.S. company bears the risk of infringement 
in a U.S. court for activities undertaken during the R&D stage.86 
Considering the incredible costs of enforcement (which is discussed in 
                                                     
81. See infra note 118 (detailing the average costs of patent litigation in the United States); Moore, 
supra note 80, at 461–62 (explaining how the costs of infringement can deter innovation). 
82. Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Better, Faster, Cheaper—Later: What Happens When 
Technologies Are Suppressed, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 23, 50 (2004) (“Sham 
litigation, involving predatory patent infringement suits or threats of suits, may lead a competitor to 
withhold an innovation when it cannot afford to defend the case. Such litigation and threats are made 
in bad faith, with the intent to suppress the patented invention and competition. Larger firms have an 
advantage in developing and promoting new innovations and an ability to intimidate smaller firms 
through legal challenges to the validity of their patents. Smaller firms may have no choice but to 
settle.” (footnotes omitted)). 
83. See The Patent, Used as a Sword, supra note 79 (describing the manner in which an inventor 
can become subject to a patent infringement suit during the R&D stage). 
84. See infra Sections III.A, III.B (presenting the costs associated with patent enforcement and 
litigation). 
85. See Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1912 (asserting that the stronger patent rights in the United 
States have rendered U.S. firms less competitive against international firms). 
86. Bernard Chao, Patent Imperialism, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 77, 89–90 (2014) (“It is simply 
bad policy for the United States to force their own companies to endure such exposure when 
companies with foreign facilities do not.”).  
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Part III), U.S. firms could become more competitive by offshoring their 
R&D and manufacturing—i.e., the most socially and economically 
valuable components of the supply chain.87 
This scenario is not purely of imagination either. Vlingo, for example, 
was in the business of developing voice recognition technology until it 
was imperiled by patent litigation.88 Rival firms sought to acquire Vlingo 
and its R&D program once Vlingo appeared capable of developing 
successful technology.89 After Vlingo rebuffed these overtures, one 
competitor, Nuance, changed course and filed a lawsuit alleging that 
Vlingo infringed patents owned by Nuance.90 According to Vlingo, this 
lawsuit was meant to obstruct its R&D programs by shifting the 
company’s resources away from innovation and toward litigation.91 
Although a jury found Vlingo not liable of infringement, the costs of 
defending the lawsuit frustrated Vlingo’s ability to fund further research.92 
Nuance eventually purchased Vlingo and incorporated its technology into 
Apple’s Siri software.93 In retrospect, Vlingo’s folly may have been its 
willingness to invent in the United States because, had it innovated in a 
country offering a cheaper and quicker process to litigate patent disputes, 
Vlingo might have survived.94 
                                                     
87. See Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1935. 
88. See The Patent, Used as a Sword, supra note 79. 
89. Id. 
90. Nuance Commc’ns Inc. v. Vlingo Corp., No. 09-11414-RWZ, 2010 WL 1416138, at *1 (D. 
Mass Apr. 2, 2010); see Peter Cohan, 5 Reasons to Scrap Our Patent System: #1 Apple’s Siri, FORBES 
(Oct. 8, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2012/10/08/5-reasons-to-scrap-our-patent-
system-1-apples-siri/#7dd122ee28a6 [https://perma.cc/MR7D-TVBE] (reviewing litigation against 
Vlingo over voice recognition technology). 
91. See The Patent, Used as a Sword, supra note 79 (“Mr. Ricci issued an ultimatum: Mr. Phillips 
could sell his firm to Mr. Ricci or be sued for patent infringements. When Mr. Phillips refused to sell, 
Mr. Ricci’s company filed the first of six lawsuits. Soon after, Apple and Google stopped returning 
phone calls. The company behind Siri switched its partnership from Mr. Phillips to Mr. Ricci’s firm. 
And the millions of dollars Mr. Phillips had set aside for research and development were redirected 
to lawyers and court fees.”). 
92. Dante Cesa, Nuance Gobbles up Vlingo, Yearns to Transcribe Its Own Announcement, 
ENGADGET (Dec. 21, 2011), https://www.engadget.com/2011/12/21/nuance-gobbles-up-vlingo-
yearns-to-transcribe-its-own-announcem/ [https://perma.cc/8EJA-KYJB] (“Apparently, if you can’t 
(legally) beat them, you buy them. Such is the thinking over at Nuance, who has decided to acquire 
its competitor and former courtroom dance partner, Vlingo.”). 
93. See Robin Wauters, After Years of Patent Litigation, Nuance Acquires Vlingo, TECHCRUNCH 
(Dec. 20, 2011), https://techcrunch.com/2011/12/20/after-years-of-patent-litigation-nuance-acquires-
vlingo/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2019) (describing the sale of Vlingo to Nuance which used Vlingo 
technology and incorporated it into Siri). 
94. See, e.g., Bernard Knight & Goud Maragani, It Is Time for the United States to Implement a 
Patent Box Tax Regime to Encourage Domestic Manufacturing, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 41 
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To confirm whether Vlingo’s experience should have been expected, 
we conducted interviews with IP attorneys stationed in several countries 
working for prominent law firms. These attorneys confirmed that the 
extraordinary costs of U.S. patent law.95 One patent attorney working in 
the Tel Aviv office of an international law firm lamented about the costs 
of U.S. patent enforcement, expressly remarking that clients should be 
advised to manufacture under the laws of countries offering less 
burdensome patent environments.96 A common sentiment is that the costly 
nature of American patent litigation subjects small inventors to abuse by 
dominant companies.97 While additional patent attorneys expressed 
similar views,98 a few lawyers described U.S. patent enforcement as the 
extraordinary cost of doing business in the United States.99 
As for other global implications mentioned by interviewees, the 
dangers of entanglement in patent litigation seem to have caused firms to 
station manufacturing, production, and other aspects of the supply chain 
in foreign countries.100 Our interviews also suggested that some firms 
resist selling finished products in the United States to avoid being taxed 
by dominant firms; this is especially problematic if such lawsuits impede 
input technology from entering the United States, frustrating downstream 
innovation.101 Indeed, the defense of a patent claim imposes such costs 
that, not only does it incentivize predatory litigation, but it may also cause 
firms to innovate under the patent laws of foreign countries. 
C. The Perils of Inventing in the United States, as Told by Marvell 
Technology Group 
In Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd.,102 
one firm’s willingness to invent in the United States caused it to suffer 
unimaginable liability, prompting major technology companies to opine 
                                                     
(suggesting that companies are more likely to conduct R&D in countries that have implemented a 
“patent box”). 
95. See infra notes 96–99. 
96. Email interview with an Of Counsel in the Tel Aviv office of an international law firm (Jan. 
17, 2018) (on file with author). 
97. See Email Interview with an Of Counsel of the Tokyo office of an international law firm (Jan. 
18, 2018) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with a Partner of an Asian office of an 
international law firm (Jan. 23, 2018). 
98. Telephone Interview with a Partner in the Taipei office of an international law firm (Mar. 13, 2018). 
99. Telephone Interview with a Partner in the Palo Alto office of an international law firm (Apr. 2, 2018). 
100. Telephone Interview with a Partner in the Taipei office of an international law firm (Mar. 13, 2018). 
101. Id. 
102. 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied in part, 805 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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that U.S. patent law incentivizes them to offshore innovation and R&D. 
Carnegie Mellon University (Carnegie Mellon or CMU) sued Marvell in 
2014 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
for infringement of patents invented by José Moura, a CMU professor, 
and Aleksandar Kavcic, a then-doctoral student.103 At issue were CMU 
patents related to noise filtering methods associated with the reading and 
writing of magnetic hard disks.104 During trial, Carnegie Mellon provided 
evidence that Marvell conducted research in the United States and that 
Marvell used CMU’s patented method each time it ran software 
conveniently titled “kavcic.c.”105 After CMU provided sufficient evidence 
to prove that Marvell had infringed, the issue before the court became the 
appropriate royalty rate to compensate CMU. 
The question of how to measure CMU’s award proved critical. Marvell 
manufactured the unauthorized products overseas and then imported some 
of the infringing products into the United States while others remained 
exclusively abroad.106 Recall that courts strictly construe the U.S. patent 
system’s territorial limitations, awarding damages only for acts of 
infringement taking place inside the United States.107 This called into 
question whether a U.S. court could measure CMU’s damages with 
Marvell’s foreign sales of goods that had never entered the United States. 
CMU argued that because Marvell’s R&D took place in the United States 
using CMU’s patented method, Marvell’s worldwide sales were derived 
from the domestic use of CMU’s invention.108 The royalty base should, 
CMU insisted, include all products entirely made and sold abroad.109 The 
jury agreed, as did the district court, awarding the CMU a $1.17 billion 
                                                     
103. Torsten Ove & Bill Schackner, Financial Windfall for CMU After Settling Patent Infringement 
Suit, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.post-
gazette.com/local/city/2016/02/17/CMU-computer-chip-maker-resolve-7-year-old-patent-
infringement-suit/stories/201602170232 [https://perma.cc/76A6-FMJ4]. 
104. See Marvell, 807 F.3d at 1289 (describing the patented technology at issue). 
105. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., No. 2014-1492, 2014 WL 183212, at *9 (W.D. 
Pa. Jan. 14, 2014) (“At his deposition, Dr. Kavcic testified that he learned from former Marvell 
employees (Peter Kou and another individual whose name he could not recall) in 2004 ‘that Marvell 
has a routine in their detector with my name on it, kavcic.c.’”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in 
part, 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
106. Marvell, 807 F.3d at 1302 (discussing the issue of how to calculate damages and the related 
extraterritoriality of the damages award). 
107. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) (“Our patent system 
makes no claim to extraterritorial effect; ‘these acts of Congress do not, and were not intended to, 
operate beyond the limits of the United States’ . . . .”). 
108. Marvell, 807 F.3d at 1291–92 (establishing that the jury awarded CMU $1,169,140,271 as a 
reasonable royalty based upon Marvell’s worldwide sales). 
109. See id. at 1305. 
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royalty—one of the largest patent damages award in history at that time.110 
Carnegie Mellon and Marvell eventually settled their dispute for 
$750 million before exhausting appeals,111 which assuredly included 
compensation for foreign sales. 
Notably, Marvell illustrates the risks of innovating where patent rights 
are stronger, as well as the willingness of firms to relocate their R&D 
programs to avoid these costs. CMU amplified Marvell’s exposure to 
litigation and liability by pinning Marvell’s worldwide sales to its 
California laboratories.112 Had Marvell innovated outside of the United 
States, a U.S. court could have only compelled Marvell to pay damages 
on domestic sales.113 For foreign acts of infringement, CMU must sue 
Marvell in each jurisdiction where the activity occurred using that 
jurisdiction’s patent laws. And in any of those countries, the costs of 
litigation and damages would have been a slight fraction of the U.S. 
settlement.114 
As for the industry’s response to Marvell, an amicus brief filed by 
several major technology companies—including Dell, Google, Hewlett-
Packard, and Broadcom—signaled their willingness to extract their 
research and innovation from the United States as means to limit their 
exposure to liability under U.S. patent law115: 
If this Court affirms this result, it would encourage companies to 
relocate research, development, and testing activities outside this 
country to avoid exposure to enormous damages awards such as 
the one here. Why would a company test and validate samples in 
                                                     
110. Id. at 1288; Klint Finley, Chip Maker Vows to Fight Record-Breaking $1.17B Patent Award, 
WIRED (Dec. 27, 2012, 6:34PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/12/marvell-patent-award/ 
[https://perma.cc/94GA-8EJV]. 
111. See Ryan Davis, Marvell, Carnegie Mellon Reach $750M Deal to End Patent War, LAW 360 
(Feb. 17, 2016, 5:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/760331/marvell-carnegie-mellon-reach-
750m-deal-to-end-patent-war (last visited July 3, 2017). 
112. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 986 F. Supp. 2d 574, 634–35 (W.D. Pa. 
2013) (discussing CMUs’s theory linking worldwide activity to its domestic practices), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, rev’d in part, 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
113. Id. at 635. 
114. See infra Part III (explaining the elevated costs of patent enforcement in the United States). 
115. Brief for Broadcom Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 3, Carnegie Mellon 
Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 2014-1492), 
http://www.cmu.edu/patent-lawsuit/images/timeline/2014-08-11-MarvellCompanyBrief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QQR7-2XEM] (arguing that “allowing U.S. patentees to base damages on worldwide 
sales would threaten massive liability and encourage innovative companies to move research, 
development, and testing activities abroad”); see also Chao, supra note 86, at 88 (arguing that liberalizing 
the orthodox approach to the extraterritorial limits to patent law would harm domestic industry by causing 
it to relocate to other countries: “Given a sufficiently hostile patent environment, companies may well 
decide to move their research, development and sales facilities offshore as well.”). 
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this country, for example, when doing so could expose it to a 
damage award based on worldwide sales? As discussed above, 
technology industries are highly international, and companies will 
be tempted to transfer as many activities as possible to 
jurisdictions that will not impose such draconian worldwide 
patent liability—even though it otherwise would be inefficient to 
do so.116 
III. THE ATTRIBUTES OF PATENT LAW INFLUENCING 
WHERE FIRMS CHOOSE TO INNOVATE 
A company considering where to innovate must consider the likelihood 
of defending an infringement lawsuit and the risks associated with the 
same.117 The aspects of patent law that are most likely to affect the 
location of R&D cluster around three areas: (1) the cost of litigation, 
(2) the remedies available, and (3) the odds of ending up in litigation. 
A. Cost of Litigation 
The cost of litigating an infringement dispute in the United States might 
generate more grievances than any other aspect of U.S. patent law. A 2015 
report by the American Intellectual Property Law Association118 found 
that the median cost to litigate a single-patent infringement claim through 
trial was about five million dollars for cases with more than twenty-five 
million dollars at risk.119 The data compiled by our project determined 
similarly that the expense to defend an infringement lawsuit in the United 
States, regardless of the amount at risk, hovers around three million 
dollars.120 Notably, litigants must typically bear this extraordinary 
expense even if they prevail at trial.121 
                                                     
116. Brief for Broadcom Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 27, Marvell, 807 
F.3d 1283 (No. 14-1492) (emphasis added). 
117. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text (providing public statements suggesting that U.S. 
innovation is moving abroad due to U.S. patent law). 
118. Every other year, the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) conducts an 
economic survey, gathering data from AIPLA members at firms and corporate legal departments. 
From that data, the AIPLA publishes The Report of the Economic Survey, which includes information 
related to the costs of patent litigation. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ASS’N, 2015 REPORT OF THE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY 1–3, 37 (2015) [hereinafter AIPLA SURVEY]. 
119. Id. at 37. Note, this median represents all costs associated with litigation and all proceedings, 
including inter partes review proceedings, ANDA litigation, and ITC section 337 actions. 
120. Please contact the authors for information concerning general patent infringement damages in 
the United States. 
121. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2018) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees 
to the prevailing party.”); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 553, 
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Figure 1: 
Top Ten Most Expensive Jurisdictions to Litigate a Patent 
Infringement Claim by Average Cost122 
 
 
Why then is U.S. patent litigation so expensive? The answer lies in the 
numerous and lengthy procedural steps to litigate a patent in a U.S. court. 
In the typical patent case, half the costs accrue by the end of discovery, 
including early motion practice, infringement and invalidity contentions, 
written discovery, claim construction, depositions, and expert 
reports.123 During the discovery phase, the costs are mainly divided 
among document production and review, depositions, and fees for both 
technical and damages experts.124 In many cases, reports can exceed 
$125,000 per expert.125 As for the second half of expenses, the bulk of 
costs occur in the week leading up to trial and the trial week: a litigant 
must decamp a war room, hire experts for eight to ten days, and employ a 
cadre of attorneys working from morning until night to staff the trial.126 
                                                     
554 n.6 (2014) (noting that the prevailing party in an infringement case can only recoup attorney’s 
fees and costs in extraordinary circumstances, and a significant factor tipping towards such a finding 
is whether the case brought by the losing party was frivolous). 
122. This figure was generated using confidential data collected by Darts-ip (2000–2013). Please 
contact the authors for more information. 
123. This information is derived from the author’s personal experience litigating both the plaintiff 
and defendant sides of patent infringement litigation.  
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
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The second largest bump in post-discovery expenses stems from the major 
briefing exchanges of Daubert and summary judgment motions.127 
Adding to the already sizeable bill is the possibility of a concurrent inter 
partes review proceeding,128 which typically costs between $300,000 and 
$500,000, including expert fees and filing expenses.129  
Due to the extraordinary costs of litigating a patent infringement claim 
in an American court, some firms have sought to initiate patent 
infringement lawsuits against innovators as a means to extract rents.130 As 
discussed earlier, dominant firms use litigation costs to impede new 
entrants from developing competing technology131 while others have 
initiated infringement claims—even if lacking merit—to pressure the 
patentee-defendant to settle out of court for a lower dollar amount than 
the cost of litigation.132 In other words, the mere threat of spending 
millions of dollars on litigation has induced firms to pay significant 
settlements despite whether their adversaries are likely to prevail at trial. 
Considering the number of active patent holders who employ this strategy 
or contract other firms to do so—a practice known as patent 
privateering133—nuisance patent lawsuits in the United States have been 
unfairly attributed solely to non-practicing entities (NPEs, also 
pejoratively known as “patent trolls”).134 As a result, lawsuits and 
licensing agreements tend to be detached from the value of technology 
and, instead, pinned to the higher costs of litigation. 
                                                     
127. Id.; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
128. See infra Section V.B.I. (explaining inter partes review). 
129. AIPLA SURVEY, supra note 118, at 38. 
130. See Emily H. Chen, Making Abusers Pay: Deterring Patent Litigation by Shifting Attorneys’ 
Fees, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 351, 354 (2013) (explaining the economics of nuisance and abusive 
patent infringement lawsuits attributable to the American rule). 
131. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, 9 J.L. ECON. 
& POL’Y 59, 87–93 (2012) (analyzing indirect costs of patent litigation, such as market capitalization 
and investment level costs, or “how much litigation ‘taxes’ investment in innovation”); Kurt M. 
Saunders & Linda Levine, Better, Faster, Cheaper-Later: What Happens When Technologies Are 
Suppressed, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 23, 50 (2004) (describing the manner in which 
some firms use “sham litigation” to deter competitors from innovating). 
132. Stijepko Tokic, The Role of Consumers in Deterring Settlement Agreements Based on Invalid 
Patents: The Case of Non-Practicing Entities, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 3–7 (describing the NPE 
business model). 
133. See generally Matthew Sipe, Patent Privateers and Antitrust Fears, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 191 (2016). 
134. See, e.g., Jim Kerstetter, Daily Report: Apple Hurls the ‘Patent Troll’ Insult at Nokia, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/technology/daily-report-apple-hurls-
the-patent-troll-insult-at-nokia.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/2PMR-NHJ4] (discussing Nokia’s 
alleged use of patent litigation to extract rents). 
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In comparison to the price of litigating a patent claim in the United 
States, an infringement suit in Austria costs about $100,000.135 The price 
of doing the same in China is only $125,000.136 In fact, the cost of patent 
litigation is typically under one million dollars in every European 
nation—and even cheaper in developing nations.137 Australia and Hong 
Kong are the only jurisdictions that equal or approximate U.S. litigation 
expenses.138 In light of this, firms have strong incentives to minimize 
exposure to patent litigation by developing technology overseas. 
B. Remedies / Damages Awards 
Because even accidental copying constitutes infringement, firms must 
consider not just the expense of defending an infringement claim, but also 
the costs of losing the lawsuit. This concern is particularly salient in the 
United States where patent owners have received damages awards that far 
exceed the injuries suffered.139 In fact, the types of remedies a plaintiff 
may seek—including monetary damages, injunctive relief, and punitive 
damages—affect the risks of innovation in the United States, which firms 
can lessen by developing technology in countries providing weaker patent 
rights. 
  
                                                     
135. This figure was drawn from confidential data collected by Darts-ip (2000–2013). Please 
contact the authors for more information. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. See infra text accompanying notes 146–149 (discussing the substantial royalty damages that 
a U.S. court may issue). 
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Figure 2: 
Single Largest Damages Awards by Country140 
 
 
The primary remedy available under U.S. patent law is monetary 
damages.141 In general, patentees may either pursue a reasonable royalty, 
lost profits, or a combination thereof.142 To calculate a reasonable royalty, 
the courts imagine a hypothetical negotiation between a willing licensor 
and licensee at the time of the infringement.143 Even though only 
practicing entities may receive lost profits,144 interestingly, NPEs tend to 
                                                     
140. This figure was generated using confidential data collected by Darts-ip (2000–2013). Please 
contact the authors for more information. 
141. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018) (monetary damages are designed to “compensate for the infringement, 
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer”). 
142. Schneider (Europe) AG v. SciMed Life Sys., 852 F. Supp. 813, 857 (D. Minn. 1994) (“It is 
permissible to award damages containing a combination of lost profits and a reasonable royalty.” 
(citing State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’d, 60 F.3d 
839 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
143. Aqua Shield v. Inter Pool Cover Team, 774 F.3d 766, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The ‘value of 
what was taken’—the value of the use of the patented technology—measures the royalty. A traditional 
heuristic for assessing this market value is to posit a ‘hypothetical negotiation’ between the patentee 
and adjudicated infringer and to ‘attempt[] to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties would have 
agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before infringement began.’” (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted)). 
144. Although any plaintiff can elect reasonable royalties, only practicing entities are able to 
receive lost profits since non-practicing entities, by definition, do not profit from using their patent 
portfolios. Oskar Liivak, When Nominal Is Reasonable: Damages for the Unpracticed Patent, 56 B.C. 
L. REV. 1031, 1040 (2015) (“This understanding of patent damages is critically important for non-
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obtain larger royalty awards from courts than their practicing 
counterparts.145 And if a court finds that the infringement was willful, it 
may treble (i.e., triple) the damages as a punitive measure—a remedy that 
became easier to assert after the Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse 
Electronics Inc.146 decision.147 Under the current test, the plaintiff must 
show that the infringer’s conduct was egregious in order to prove 
willfulness.148 So given that a U.S. court may compensate the patentee 
with triple the actual damages,149 a finding of infringement can generate a 
windfall award for the patentee. 
Aside from monetary damages, patentees might carry an even bigger 
stick against defendants: preliminary and full injunctive relief.150 
Injunctive relief requires a showing of irreparable harm.151 Where the 
patentee practices the patent, a permanent injunction is a strong deterrent 
against infringement—and perhaps innovation—because its issuance 
from a U.S. court bars inventors from making, using, or selling the 
                                                     
practicing patentees. Such patentees, who generally may not avail themselves of lost profits or lost 
established royalties, must rely on a reasonable royalty for their measure of damages.”). 
145. Since 2006, NPEs have obtained nearly threefold greater median damages awards. Most 
noticeably, from 2011 to 2015, the median damages award for an NPE was $13.3 million, while the 
practicing entity median award was only $4.9 million. LANDAN ANSELL ET AL., 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2016 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 10 (2016), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2016-pwc-patent-litigation-
study.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ63-B5WH]. 
146. 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
147. In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Halo, which overruled the long-prevailing Federal 
Circuit standard for willfulness damages set forth in In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 
(2007). Seagate required that a patentee show both an objective prong and subjective prong to 
establish willfulness. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1928. The Court rejected the objective prong of Seagate 
and held that only the subjective intent is relevant to show willfulness. Id. at 1932–33; see also John 
M. Golden, Reasonable Certainty in Contract and Patent Damages, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 261 
(2017) (stating that prior to Halo, the test was “overly restrict[ive]”). 
148. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935 (“Section 284 gives district courts the discretion to award enhanced 
damages against those guilty of patent infringement. In applying this discretion, district courts are ‘to 
be guided by [the] sound legal principles’ developed over nearly two centuries of application and 
interpretation of the Patent Act. Those principles channel the exercise of discretion, limiting the award 
of enhanced damages to egregious cases of misconduct beyond typical infringement.” (quoting Martin 
v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (alteration in original)). 
149. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount 
found or assessed.”). 
150. See Ebay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006) (explaining the availability of injunctive 
relief for practicing patent, but not for NPEs); Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in 
Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1952 (2016) (finding that 
NPEs “rarely” receive injunctions after eBay). 
151. Injunctive remedies have been all but restricted to practicing entities (and in some instances, 
universities). Ebay, 547 U.S. at 393. 
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unauthorized good anywhere in the United States.152 If the practicing 
entity is asserting patent rights against one who imports the accused 
products, the patentee has another effective tool to receive an injunction 
in its arsenal: a section 337 proceeding before the International Trade 
Commission (ITC).153 In turn, considering that inventors during the R&D 
stage are often unaware or unsure of whether their art infringes upon 
another’s technology, an injunction can deprive even good faith inventors 
of any means to recoup the sunk costs of innovation and can curtail their 
business entirely.154 
In comparison to other countries, remedies in the United States tend to 
be substantially more punitive and expensive for multiple reasons. First, 
the United States is one of the only countries that may subject damages 
awards to trebling.155 Second, a number of OECD countries issue almost 
exclusively equitable remedies against infringers, avoiding the imposition 
of monetary damages.156 In light of these differences, the United States’ 
                                                     
152. Illumina, Inc. v. Qiagen, N.V., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1094–95 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (enjoining 
the sales of infringing goods in the United States). 
153. Tarriff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (2018) (“[I]ndustr[ies] in the United States, 
relating to the articles protected by the patent, copyright, trademark, mask work, or design concerned, 
exists or is in the process of being established.”). The ITC is authorized to issue exclusion orders 
enforced by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, barring the infringing articles from import into 
the United States. Id. § 1337(a)(3) (To receive an exclusion order, the complainant must show that 
there is “(A) significant investment in plant and equipment; (B) significant employment of labor or 
capital; or (C) substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, research and 
development, or licensing.”); see Taras M. Czebiniak, When Congress Gives Two Hats, Which Do 
You Wear? Choosing Between Domestic Industry Protection and IP Enforcement in Section 337 
Investigations, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 102 (2011) (“The most important ITC remedy today is 
the exclusion order. U.S. Customs and Border Protection enforces ITC exclusion orders at the border, 
a system meant to prevent infringing articles from entering the United States without further action 
by the complainant. Exclusion orders come in two varieties: limited and general. The default 
exclusion order is of limited scope (limited exclusion order, or ‘LEO’), and it applies only to those 
parties noticed as respondents to a particular complaint filed at the ITC. The default scope of the order 
is limited because of public notice concerns regarding an exclusion order’s potential effect on 
unnamed parties.” (footnotes omitted)). Proceedings before the ITC are known to be exceedingly 
short yet still expensive. When combined with an action in district court, the threat of de facto 
injunctive relief via a section 337 action makes the ITC a strong, and unique, pressure point in patent 
litigation in the United States. See James E. Daily & F. Scott Kieff, Benefits of Patent Jury Trials for 
Commercializing Innovation, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 869 (2014). 
154. See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of Obviousness in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 
80–81 (2008) (“Collectively, this patent thicket will decrease innovation and increase social costs 
both by imposing significant licensing fees upon anyone working in the field and by potentially 
generating expensive litigation based on accidental infringement.”). 
155. See supra notes 146–149.  
156. Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine 
War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 167 (2011) (discussing the economics of patent thickets and 
noting that “according to economic theory, the problem of such excessive fragmentation of ownership 
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patent scheme imposes costs on infringers that, on average, exceed every 
other nation. For example, U.S. courts have confirmed patent 
infringement awards of $2.5 billion,157 compared to China which has 
never issued more than the equivalent of $7.5 million in damages.158 One 
of the largest non-U.S. awards was levied in Canada when a 
pharmaceutical company was ordered to pay $180 million in damages—
however, even that amount would fail to crack the top ten largest damages 
awards in the United States.159 Since the act of innovation exposes 
inventors to infringement claims in that jurisdiction, it stands to reason 
that innovators would prefer to develop technology where the costs of 
infringement are relatively less expensive—if so, this would incentivize 
innovation in countries other than the United States. 
C. Patent Grants, Density, and Thickets 
Could patent density in the United States explain the hesitancy of 
companies to center their R&D in the states? The chance of litigation 
mounts when the market is saturated with patents—known as a patent 
thicket.160 This is because, as a primary concern, a large volume of patents 
in an industry increases the odds that an inventor may accidentally 
infringe one of them.161 For example, approximately 250,000 active 
patents are used in the modern smartphone, ignoring the dormant patents 
that can also form the basis of an infringement lawsuit.162 Even if an 
                                                     
interests is straightforward: it increases transaction costs, accentuates hold-out problems, and 
precipitates costly litigation”). 
157. Barry Herman, Lessons from the Largest Patent Damages Award in History, LAW360 (Jan. 
20, 2017, 10:42 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/882857/lessons-from-the-largest-patent-
damages-award-in-history (last visited Jan. 31, 2019). 
158. Fromer, supra note 154, at 80–81 (noting the problems of accidental infringement borne to 
patent thickets); Pauline Booth, Latest Decision: Highest Damages Award in the Specialized IP Court 
in Beijing of $7.5 Million – Also Awarded Attorney Fees Charged by Hour, DUFF & PHELPS (Dec. 
23, 2016), http://www.duffandphelps.com/insights/publications/litigation-and-disputes/highest-
damages-award-in-the-specialized-ip-court-in-beijing [https://perma.cc/NN6T-MP8Z]. 
159. Steven Mason & David Tait, Largest Patent Infringement Award in Canada Stands: Apotex 
Denied Leave to Appeal to the SCC, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 14, 2016), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ea0edfd9-1ddc-4c2f-b937-cde716e74ede 
[https://perma.cc/EK24-EMJ2]. 
160. See Herman, supra note 157. 
161. Fromer, supra note 154, at 80–81 (noting the problems of accidental infringement borne to 
patent thickets). 
162. Mike Masnick, There are 250,000 Active Patents that Impact Smartphones; Representing One 
in Six Active Patents Today, INNOVATION (Oct. 18, 2012), https://www.techdirt.com/blog/inno 
vation/articles/20121017/10480520734/there-are-250000-active-patents-that-impact-smartphones-
representing-one-six-active-patents-today.shtml [https://perma.cc/7REM-6T29]. 
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inventor detects each blocking patent, the existence of a thicket raises the 
costs of innovation by forcing the inventor to design around the 
anticommons.163 
Patent thickets also create troublesome incentives to wage meritless 
litigation.164 Some bad faith litigants have overwhelmed practicing 
entities by acquiring thousands of patents regardless of the patents’ 
quality. This type of action allows an entity to essentially weaponize their 
own patent thickets: 
Their scale often enables them to license without litigation 
because defendants are reluctant to challenge an entire portfolio 
of patents. The patent aggregation model depends on patent 
intensity in an industry; it works because the patent aggregator 
has so many patents that read on a particular target that a 
challenge to the validity of the patents makes little sense.165 
And because patent infringement is a strict liability tort, the question of 
whether an inventor accused of infringement was aware of the pre-
existing patent, or made a good faith effort to find it, has no exculpatory 
value.166 As a result, patent thickets can ex ante and ex post raise the costs 
of innovation, thereby discouraging R&D investment.167 
The countries with the most patents in force are the most likely to be 
burdened by patent thickets. Historically, the United States has issued the 
most patents, which is attributable to the size of the American market; 
since both domestic and foreign inventors sell their technologies in the 
United States, inventors have sought to guard their market share by 
obtaining U.S. patents. Indeed, there are no requirements—in the United 
                                                     
163. Mossoff, supra note 156, at 166–67 (“A ‘patent thicket’ exists when too many patents 
covering individual elements of a commercial product are separately owned by different entities. This 
concept is . . . based on Professor Michael Heller’s theory of the anticommons in real property, which 
arises when there is excessive fragmentation of ownership interests in a single parcel of land. 
According to economic theory, the problem of such excessive fragmentation of ownership interests 
is straightforward: it increases transaction costs, accentuates hold-out problems, and precipitates 
costly litigation, which prevents commercial development of the affected property.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
164. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 368 (2010).  
165. Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2117, 2127 (2013). 
166. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1922 (2015) (“[T]he 
discussion here also refers to direct infringement, § 271(a), a strict-liability offense in which a 
defendant’s mental state is irrelevant . . . .”). 
167. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(“Eliminating generically-implemented software patents would clear the patent thicket, ensuring that 
patent protection promotes, rather than impedes, ‘the onward march of science’ and allowing 
technological innovation to proceed apace.” (citation omitted)). 
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States, China, Japan, Europe, Korea, and most other nations—that a patent 
applicant reside in the country where the applicant seeks protection. As 
one may imagine, firms have not been bashful in applying for patents in 
their non-resident jurisdictions.168 Despite the alarm expressed in some 
corners that the United States no longer receives the most patent 
applications, there are substantially more patents currently in force in the 
United States than anywhere else, sitting at a little over 2.5 million.169 
 
Figure 3: 
Top Ten Countries for Most Patents in Force in 2013170 
 
 
As a result, firms intending to innovate in the United States face the 
largest existing base of patents blocking the item’s potential use. In many 
situations, the patents in force create patent thickets that make entry into 
                                                     
168. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART CALENDAR YEARS 
1963-2015 (2016), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZVL4-DYDZ]. 
169. According to data from the World Intellectual Property Organization, inventors are rushing to 
China to file their patent applications: of the roughly 2.68 million patent applications filed in 2014, 
800,000 of those applications were to the State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic 
of China (SIPO). WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 23 
(2014), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WD5-
BM6N]. These 800,000 applications were more than the applications in the United States and Japan, 
combined. Id. So despite the increasing popularity of other countries as a place to file patents—and 
perhaps invent—it is unlikely that, any time soon, another nation will have a greater anticommons 
than the United States. Id. at 51. 
170. This figure was generated using confidential data collected by Darts-ip (2000–2013). Please 
contact the authors for more information. 
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those markets risky and costly. If a company primarily intends to sell its 
invention abroad, developing technology where relatively fewer patents 
are in force makes sense. The next Part tests not only whether inventors 
prefer to innovate in countries that offer less costly and risky patent 
schemes, but also whether firms even care about foreign patent laws when 
making innovation decisions. 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This Part empirically tests whether patent scholarship has so far missed 
a critical element of innovation, namely whether firms avoid the costs and 
risks of innovation by developing technology in more hospitable patent 
environments. The results have substantial implications for the U.S. patent 
system, which we show is the world’s costliest and most litigious. We 
expect firms to innovate in jurisdictions that (1) minimize the costs of 
litigating a patent infringement lawsuit, (2) issue relatively inexpensive 
damages awards, and (3) offer a less challenging anticommons. We also 
anticipate, contrary to popular logic, that research and innovation 
decisions are seldom influenced by the strength of patent protection.171 If 
anything, we think inventors in the R&D stage prefer jurisdictions 
offering weaker patent rights. 
A. Variables 
In constructing our dataset, we are indebted to the Global IP Project 
and Darts-ip for their invaluable empirical support. Due to their 
contributions and guidance, we were able to analyze previously 
unavailable data. The dependent variable—i.e., the entity that we seek to 
explain—is the rate of innovation as measured by the annual amount of 
capital spent in a country on R&D lagged by one year.172 R&D Spending 
is an appropriate dependent variable because research investment is a 
primary activity that patent laws endeavor to incentivize. R&D Spending 
also captures many of the local benefits generated by innovation. We 
measure R&D Spending using data available through the OECD.173 
The first set of independent variables reflects different aspects of patent 
enforcement. Perhaps the most crucial factor is the average measure of 
damages issued by a national court because awards in one jurisdiction can 
                                                     
171. See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 66, at 1133 (stating that patent law “operates under the 
assumption” that rewarding inventors with stronger patent rights should encourage firms to innovate). 
172. It is common to lag a variable by a year when you would expect the effects of the independent 
variables to be apparent in the following year.  
173. Gross Domestic Spending on R&D, OECD, https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-
on-r-d.htm [https://perma.cc/Y5L2-68K6]. 
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be ruinous while negligible in another. Inventors must then consider the 
consequences of infringement, even if accidental. We measured average 
general damages using data provided to us by Darts-ip, which tracks and 
analyzes patent infringement awards issued by national courts. 
The next variable is the average cost of defending a patent infringement 
lawsuit over a five-year period. This factor varies significantly by country. 
In some European countries, a firm can litigate a claim for under $50,000, 
as compared to the United States where commentators refer to patent 
litigation as “the sport of kings” due to its multimillion-dollar costs and 
high stakes nature.174 The Global IP Project, which surveys patent 
infringement awards issued by the most active patent enforcement 
jurisdictions, graciously provided us data for litigation costs.175 
We also test whether the number of patents in force in a country creates 
such a daunting anticommons that firms become more likely to invent 
where fewer pre-existing patents may form the basis of a lawsuit. Data for 
the number of patents in force by country are available from the World 
Intellectual Property Organization.176 
A fourth component is the strength of patent protection. Although 
patent protection is thought to have little influence upon where firms 
innovate, there are countervailing practical considerations: piracy is most 
tenable in close proximity to a firm’s R&D.177 The locals staffing a project 
receive training and knowledge to replicate the patented device or method, 
encouraging firms to innovate where one’s patent rights are protected 
from the most likely pirates.178 Although this Article expects weaker 
patent rights to promote innovation, this assumes that patent protection is 
at least adequate. Patent protection is represented by a composite index 
compiled by Park and Grimarte.179 
                                                     
174. See Todd Hixon, For Most Small Companies Patents Are Just About Worthless, FORBES (Oct. 4, 
2013, 12:57 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/toddhixon/2013/10/04/for-most-small-companies-
patents-are-just-about-worthless/#211b6ffe3ef3 [https://perma.cc/GMP9-PGZK] (describing patent 
litigation as the “sport of kings”).  
175. Please contact the authors about data for patent litigation.  
176. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS (2015), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2015-part1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWX2-82SW]. 
177. See Jeong-Yeong Lee & Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection and U.S. Foreign 
Direct Investment, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 181, 181 (1996) (asserting that companies are likely to 
place their operations in countries that protect IP rights or, if a country does not protect IP rights, that 
it is likely to place older technology).  
178. Id. 
179. See generally Walter G. Park, International Patent Protection: 1960-2005, 37 RES. POL’Y 761 (2008).  
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The use of control variables in this study has a greater significance than 
usual.180 Here, we utilize a number of non-patent variables known to 
affect the rate of innovation. If the control variables prove to be 
statistically significant while the patent variables are insignificant, this 
would strongly suggest that firms are almost entirely concerned with 
traditional business factors rather than patent laws in determining how and 
where to innovate. For instance, a jurisdiction’s corporate tax rate has 
been theorized to have a salient influence on innovation.181 We also 
include a variable for whether a country offers inventors a “patent box.”182 
First established by Ireland in 2000, the patent box is a generous tax rate 
applied to profits accrued from patented devices and methods.183 It is 
expressly intended to induce companies to commercialize technology 
developed in that country.184 Patent box is a dummy variable, meaning 
that it is scored as either a 1 (1=patent box) or 0 (0=no patent box). 
Another variable is a country’s human capital surplus.185 Considering that 
a country’s education level and technical experience are critical to its 
ability to perform high-level R&D, we measure human capital as 
reflecting the percentage of a country’s population that is employed in a 
research sector.186 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capital is also 
included because a country’s wealth and market size are thought to be 
                                                     
180. Control variables protect against spurious correlations by accounting for the determinants that 
actually drive the studied relationship. 
181. See Email with a Partner in the Dublin office of an international law firm (on file with author) 
(explaining that companies primarily consider a country’s tax code when determining where to 
conduct R&D).  
182. See Graetz & Doud, supra note 36, at 362–64 (describing the attributes of a patent box).  
183. Fiona Reddan, Ireland Jumps on to the Knowledge-Box Wagon Early, IRISH TIMES (Apr. 4, 
2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.irishtimes.com/sponsored/global-tax/ireland-jumps-on-to-the-
knowledge-box-wagon-early-1.2558640 [https://perma.cc/FW2S-S8XR] (discussing Ireland’s role as 
an innovator of the patent box).  
184. See Bernard Knight & Goud Maragani, It Is Time for the United States to Implement a Patent 
Box Tax Regime to Encourage Domestic Manufacturing, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 41 (2013) 
(advocating for the United States to enact a patent box in order to attract innovation).  
185. Potentially as important as a country’s tax rate is its human capital endowment. Human capital 
is the collective skill, training, and education of a country’s labor force. Countries with greater levels 
of human capital are more likely to attract R&D and innovation since scientists, managers, and other 
personnel can be found locally. For many firms, the human capital found abroad can produce superior 
goods than the personnel in the firm’s home country. As a result, firms may increase their R&D 
capacity by inventing in countries offering high levels of human capital. Reddan, supra note 183.   
186. See Knight & Maragani, supra note 184, at 41 (advocating for the United States to enact a 
patent box in order to attract innovation). 
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primary determinants of where firms innovate.187 Considering the 
importance of infrastructure,188 our treatment controls for the amount of 
electricity used per person, which is considered a reliable proxy for 
development and infrastructure.189 This variable is derived from the World 
Development Indicators.190 Since legal protections of property rights are 
paramount to those investing tangible assets in another country, there is a 
corresponding variable.191 We also control for the passage of time since 
cross sectional events tied to time can distort the results.192 
B. Statistical Models 
We test our hypotheses by tracking the determinants of global R&D 
spending (our dependent variable) to see which patent and business 
variables predict the international spending and flow of capital on 
innovation. The dataset spans from the years 2000 to 2013 with a unique 
observation for each year that a country is observed; thus, the unit of 
analysis is country-year. The statistical treatment uses both random effects 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) analyses. Our concern is that time series 
data can skew the results if a phenomenon is clustered within the same 
period of time, as opposed to being randomly distributed. For example, 
the recession that struck the United States in the late 2000s generated 
similar effects during the same time period in other countries. In light of 
this, a random effects test is likely the more appropriate model than OLS 
since it can accommodate for common trends over time and country. We 
verify our results using OLS—even though OLS makes the assumption 
that observations are randomly distributed over time—because it is a 
                                                     
187. See Eric C. Wang, Determinants of R&D Investment: The Extreme-Bounds-Analysis 
Approach Applied to 26 OECD Countries, 39 RES. POL’Y 103, 107 (2010) (controlling for GDP as a 
determinant of innovation).  
188. Jeffrey L. Furman et al., The Determinants of National Innovative Capacity, 31 RES. POL’Y 
899, 905 (2002) (noting the importance of physical infrastructure with respect to creating innovation).  
189. See, e.g., Michael W. Doyle & Nicholas Sambanis, International Peacebuilding: A 
Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 779, 789 (2000) (using electricity 
consumption per capita as a proxy for development). 
190. DataBank: World Development Indicators, WORLD BANK, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2019). 
191. Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 284 (2008) (“As a result, 
industries that find the security of property rights lacking in a given nation may avoid engaging in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) with that nation.”). 
192. The study uses time control variables that increases by one for each year of the study. 
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common approach employed by other studies explaining innovation by 
country, but we also included a control variable for time.193 
C. Results 
The results provide fresh insights into how patent laws influence where 
firms innovate, and it spells trouble for the U.S. Patent Act. According to 
the random effects and OLS analyses, firms strongly consider the nature 
of a country’s patent enforcement system when deciding where to 
innovate. 
For example, the random effects analysis in Model 1 indicates that 
firms are more likely to place their R&D operations in countries where 
the costs of losing an infringement lawsuit are minimized, as measured by 
the negative and statistically significant variable of Average Damages.194 
This result was expected by our research, as those innovating a patentable 
good are more likely to be sued by those owning pre-existing patented 
technology than to sue them. As such, we find that inventors prefer 
jurisdictions where the prospective damages a court may issue are 
lessened. 
  
                                                     
193. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Doh et al., Foreign Research and Development and Host Country 
Environment: An Empirical Examination of U.S. International R&D, 45 MGMT. INT’L REV. 121, 139–
40 (2005) (using regression analysis to gauge the determinants of R&D spending over time); P.M. 
Rao et al., R&D Offshoring in Multinational Enterprises, 22 COMPETITIVENESS REV. 376, 386 (2012) 
(employing an OLS regression to analyze national innovation). 
194. To interpret the results, a positive coefficient represents that the variable has a positive 
relationship with the dependent variable. This means that as the independent variable increases, so 
too does R&D spending. A negative coefficient represents the opposite—an inverse relationship—
indicating that as the independent variable increases, R&D spending declines. Statistically significant 
variables are bolded with asterisks representing the level of significance. 
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Table 1: 
Random Effects Analyses195 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
R&D Expenditures   
Average Damages - 0.0010369* 
(0.0005764) 
 
Costs of Defense  - 0.0030835** 
(0.0010823) 
Patent Strength 763,756 
(474,470) 
452,050.1 
(282,669.8) 
Researchers/Capita 99,003.02*** 
(18,919.47) 
(97,750.64)*** 
(11,932.52) 
GDP 0.0000000616*** 
(0.0000000128) 
0.000000703*** 
(0.0000000119) 
Corporate Tax - 1,372.011 
(4,457.974) 
- 5,240.221 
(4,386.821) 
Property Rights - 47,728.45 
(25,102.94) 
- 13,528.09 
(15,293.33) 
Power 27.23743 
(18.47236) 
22.44285 
(15.54419) 
Constant - 2,246,765 
(2,011,454) 
- 966,477.5 
(1,237,379) 
Prob. > F 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Chi-Squared  
Observations 
166.65 
80 
181.91 
168 
Standard errors are given in parentheses; *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
A similar conclusion is that the actual cost of litigating the lawsuit—
ignoring the size of the judgment and damages rendered—helps to 
determine where firms innovate. Model 2 illustrates the negative and 
statistically significant relationship that average cost of patent litigation 
has on R&D Spending. This finding indicates that the actual cost of 
defending a lawsuit deters innovation—or, more articulately, causes 
inventors to place their R&D in jurisdictions where patent litigation is less 
costly. 
The OLS regressions produced similar results as the Random effects 
models. In Models 3 and 4, average damages was statistically significant 
and negative, as was average cost to defend a lawsuit, meaning that firms 
                                                     
195. This table was generated using confidential data collected by Darts-ip (2000–2013). Please 
contact the authors for more information. 
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are likely to resist spending on R&D in countries that impose high costs 
on innovation in terms of both litigation and damages. 
These results have powerful implications for the U.S. patent system. 
Not only is the typical infringement lawsuit in the United States costly 
and drawn out, but bad faith litigants have devised ways to exploit these 
extraordinary costs, namely, by waging patent litigation as a means to 
extract settlements and impede competition.196 In comparison, the cost of 
litigating a patent infringement lawsuit in other countries can be less than 
$50,000, which is only 2% of the cost in the United States. This explains 
why, as we have found, inventors place their R&D programs in countries 
with less costly patent enforcement regimes than the United States. If the 
United States would like to better incentivize and retain innovation, then 
reforms must be made to the litigious and expensive nature of patent 
enforcement. 
  
                                                     
196. See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text. 
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Table 2: 
OLS Regressions197 
 
 Model 3 Model 4 
R&D Expenditures   
Average Damages - 0.0054106** 
(0.0025766) 
 
Costs of Litigation   - 0.0105919** 
(0.0033783) 
Patent Strength 348,217.2 
(270,320.6) 
180,199.8 
(146,549.4) 
Researchers/Capita 350.218*** 
(29.2877) 
(388.7775)*** 
(21.52344) 
GDP 0.0000000939*** 
(0.0000000133) 
0.000000116*** 
(0.0000000174) 
Power - 36.56788*** 
(10.23803) 
- 23.06874** 
(7.670417) 
Corporate Tax - 21,826.88** 
(10,545.2) 
- 16,306.19** 
(6,801.04) 
Property Rights 150,623.1** 
(46,953.86) 
71,247.12*** 
(31,646.88) 
Time Control 5,920.489 
(14,914.77) 
- 4,084.688 
(10,485.58) 
Constant - 1,239,234 
(1,078,012) 
- 271,114.6 
(613,141) 
R-Squared  
Observations 
0.8618*** 
80 
0.8045*** 
179 
Standard errors are given in parentheses; *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
We were surprised to find, though, that patent density seems to have 
scant independent effect on where firms decide to invent. This variable 
was statistically insignificant despite how we measured the dependent 
variable or analyzed the relationship: not only was the number of patents 
in force statistically unrelated to innovation in both the OLS and random 
effects models, but it did not matter whether the dependent variable were 
reflected by R&D Spending, changes in R&D Spending, or even the 
                                                     
197. This table was generated using confidential data collected by Darts-ip (2000–2013). Please 
contact the authors for more information. 
07 - Day & Udick (3).docx (Do Not Delete) 4/4/2019  8:29 PM 
2019] PATENT LAW AND THE EMIGRATION OF INNOVATION 159 
 
number of patent infringement lawsuits initiated each year.198 In 
retrospect, this makes sense. Firms appear to care less about the density 
of patents making a lawsuit more likely than the actual costs of defending 
or losing that lawsuit.199 
Another interesting finding concerns the matter of patent protection. 
Although firms have no ability to increase their patent protection by 
inventing in a certain country, piracy is most easily achieved by those 
hired to perform the R&D in a close proximity to the operations. The 
results suggest that the strength of protection does not matter. Both the 
random effects and OLS models found a statistically insignificant 
relationship. It is our belief that firms are influenced by patent strength to 
the degree that the jurisdiction provides a baseline level of protection, 
which is the case in all advanced democracies. This finding has salient 
implications for recent industry and congressional calls to increase patent 
strength as a means to retain and incentivize innovation; our results 
suggest that efforts to increase the costs of enforcement would produce 
the opposite, undesirable result, so long as U.S. patent protection remains 
at least modestly effective. 
The models also provide strong evidence that non-patent factors affect 
where firms innovate. Naturally, tax rate influences where inventors 
prefer to operate per the OLS models (though we found no evidence in an 
unreported model that patent boxes attract innovation).200 For example, 
the decision by Apple and Google to offshore R&D to Ireland—which 
offers a 12.5% tax rate and, until 2015, a patent box—might have 
generated more tax benefits than any savings derived from patent 
protection.201 The quality of human capital also made a substantial 
                                                     
198. The additional models are unreported. Please contact the author for the results. Changes in 
R&D Spending was measured by taking the difference in the current year’s R&D spending from the 
prior year. The number of infringement lawsuits initiated each year was gathered from data issued to 
us by Darts-ip. 
199. See supra notes 130–134 and accompanying text (discussing the incentives to wage patent 
litigation based upon the high costs of defending a lawsuit). 
200. Hughes, supra note 12 (explaining that corporate tax rates among other factors are drawing 
firms to conduct R&D abroad). 
201. See Apple Expanding Cork Operation and Putting € 1 Million in Research Fund, RES. & 
INNOVATION (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.researchandinnovation.ie/apple-expanding-cork-
operations-and-putting-e1million-in-research-fund/ [https://perma.cc/8SWF-H9QK]; John Kennedy, 
Ireland Is the Data Capital of Europe, Says Google, SILICON REPUBLIC (Feb. 4, 2016), 
https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/google-ireland-data-capital-europe-crown 
[https://perma.cc/XV3M-UQPU]; Robert W. Wood, How Google Saved $3.6 Billion Taxes from 
Paper ‘Dutch Sandwich’, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2016, 9:09 AM) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2016/12/22/how-google-saved-3-6-billion-taxes-from-
paper-dutch-sandwich/#5d41b491c190 [https://perma.cc/MN74-NRM3] (describing the tax savings 
achieved by Google and Apple in the Netherlands which exceed the largest patent royalty damages 
ever awarded). 
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difference. Similarly, wealthier countries with greater consumer 
purchasing power attract more innovation, which, again, should not be 
shocking. 
In sum, the results indicate that firms strategically innovate where their 
exposure to patent enforcement and litigation is minimized. Because 
inventors prefer jurisdictions that lessen the costs of defending and losing 
an infringement lawsuit, we conclude the U.S. patent environment is 
poorly equipped to incentivize firms to develop technology domestically. 
The literature, though, due to the territorial nature of patent law, has 
heretofore underestimated or dismissed this dynamic. We also confirm 
that, contrary to industry advocates and congressional efforts, the strength 
of patent protection has little effect upon where firms innovate relative to 
patent enforcement. Although we find that conventional considerations—
such as human capital, corporate taxes, and market power—influence the 
location of innovation, patent laws are a hidden and salient part of the 
decision. As a result, any proposed reforms to patent law must understand 
the incentives and preferences of inventors during the R&D stage, 
especially if the goal is to encourage and retain innovation in the United 
States. Based upon these empirical findings, the next Part proposes 
substantive and procedural reforms to U.S. patent law that should revive 
the incentives to innovate in the United States. 
V. IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
The purpose of patent law is to promote innovation, yet scholarship has 
seldom considered where the resulting innovation takes place. This is 
despite statements by policymakers and industry lobbyists asserting that 
U.S. firms are increasingly likely to develop technology overseas due to 
a weakening of U.S. patent rights.202 Our research confirms their fears that 
companies are innovating abroad to exploit foreign patent laws. However, 
contrary to prevailing wisdom, strengthening patent rights is not the 
answer. Instead, the beneficiary jurisdictions are those that offer a more 
efficient system to defend an infringement claim. Because we find that 
less burdensome patent enforcement is more conducive to attracting 
innovation than stronger patent protection, we propose substantive and 
procedural reforms to U.S patent law to lower the costs and risks of 
enforcement. We propose amending existing patent institutions to 
(1) expand the safe harbor for experimental research, (2) create a staged 
framework to more efficiently settle patent disputes, and (3) implement a 
                                                     
202. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
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uniform “Track B” system in federal district courts to increase certain 
disclosures that promote private settlements. 
A. Expanding the Experimental Use Exception 
As Justice Story remarked when establishing the experimental use 
exception in 1823, “it could never have been the intention of the 
legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for 
philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the 
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”203 Nor, as we 
argue, should the U.S. patent system levy punishment against those who, 
without profiting off another’s invention, advance the patent system’s 
goal of promoting innovation and the sciences in the United States. By 
expanding the experimental use exception—which is currently applied in 
only limited form—Congress could reduce the costs and risks endemic to 
the R&D stage that has caused firms to innovate overseas. 
U.S. courts have significantly narrowed the experimental use defense 
since its inception during which time the critical inquiry was whether or 
not the defendant profited from the research.204 Today, the lodestar is 
whether the research has a commercial element. In making this 
determination, the courts scrutinize whether the challenged research 
related to the defendant’s business as opposed to “satisfy[ing] idle 
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”205 For example, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Connecticut in Applera Corp. v. MJ 
Research, Inc.,206 explained that the defense is unavailable to those whose 
research exhibits the “slightest commercial implication.”207 Guiding the 
court to this conclusion were prior failed uses of the defense. These 
included experiments conducted by Duke University, a non-profit 
educational institution, which incurred liability because the challenged 
research furthered Duke’s business of academic research.208 Indeed, the 
                                                     
203. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). 
204. Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities 
Deserve Special Treatment?, 59 ME. L. REV. 283, 289 (2007) (“Originally, the courts focused on 
whether the alleged infringer intended to profit from the use of another’s patent. If he did, the 
experimental use exception did not apply.”). 
205. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (ruling that research conducted 
at Duke University infringed another’s patent); Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: 
Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 909 (2009) (discussing the 
current jurisprudence of the experimental use exception). 
206. Applera Corp. v. MJ Research, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d. 293, 296 (D. Conn. 2004). 
207. Id. (citing Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362). 
208. Id. 
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courts have declared the exception to be “very limited,” “very narrow,” 
and “strictly limited.”209 
The need to expand the experimental use exception is well-illustrated 
by instances in which inventors have made good faith efforts to avoid 
infringing yet incurred liability anyway. In Embrex v. Service Engineering 
Corp.,210 Service Engineering attempted to develop a device to inoculate 
eggs via the egg’s chorioallantoic sac (CAS).211 Targeting the CAS was 
imperative because a competitor, Embrex, had patented a device that 
vaccinated a different part of the egg.212 The tests ran by Service 
Engineering were not only unsuccessful, but errantly injected vaccine into 
areas of the egg covered by the Embrex patent.213 The district court held 
that the commercial purpose underlying Service Engineering’s research 
negated the experimental use defense—despite the company’s intent to 
avoid infringing and inability to produce a marketable device—
culminating in a $500,000 damages award.214 This result demonstrates the 
risks and disincentives of inventing in the United States: a firm can 
perform unsuccessful research that sought to preserve another’s party’s 
patent rights and still incur significant liability. 
Accordingly, Congress should codify an expanded version of the 
experimental use exception in the U.S. Patent Act. Because, as we found, 
American firms are innovating abroad to avoid the costs and risks of the 
U.S. patent scheme, the experimental use exception should immunize 
research that in no way results in the sale or licensing of a good, or any 
other pecuniary benefit. Under this test, a court would examine whether 
the defendant profited from copying or using the pre-existing patent. The 
clearest example of an act failing to meet this threshold would entail 
research resulting in the defendant selling or licensing a product that 
benefitted from another’s patented device or method. 
Key to this new standard is broadly defining pecuniary gain. The 
benefit that a company receives from infringement does not always arise 
directly from a sale or license. For example, an institution’s capacity to 
                                                     
209. Id.; see Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use 
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 24 (2001) 
(“Thus, after Roche, scientists engaged in research and development having more than negligible 
commercial purpose could no longer rely on the experimental use doctrine to exempt their 
experiments from patent infringement liability.”). 
210. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
211. Id. at 1346. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 1347 (“According to the trial record, the Rosenberger tests showed that the injected 
embryos received little immunity, and that most injections penetrated beyond the CAS and into the 
amnion/yolk sac—areas covered by the ‘630 patent.’”). 
214. Id. at 1349. 
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raise funds or receive support is often attributable to successes in the 
laboratory; in that sense, when a firm has materially benefited from using 
or copying another’s invention without permission, then a court may 
appropriately conclude the conduct not only benefited the researcher but 
also deprived the inventor of a sale or license. By increasing the scope of 
pecuniary gain to include all forms of benefit, firms would retain 
incentives to invent since others could not materially profit from 
misappropriating the device or method. And critically, by eliminating 
ruinous liability for most forms of good faith and non-injurious research, 
the disincentives that have discouraged firms from inventing in the United 
States would be partially mitigated. 
It should be noted that broadening the experimental use defense beyond 
what currently exists would, to a degree, lessen the patentee’s right to 
control the invention. But patent rights, as discussed earlier, are a limited 
monopoly.215 Here, shielding types of experimental research would 
significantly bolster the incentives to invent as well as protect the public 
benefit represented by the patentee’s disclosure of the invention. In fact, 
this is hardly a radical proposal; almost this identical reform exists in the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, which permits pharmaceutical companies to 
experiment with another’s patented drug if the use is meant to gain FDA 
approval.216 As result, because the extent to which an inventor is exposed 
to liability during the R&D stage is shown to diminish innovation, a 
broader research exception would benefit invention and discovery 
occurring in the United States without overly diminishing the rights of 
pre-existing patent holders. 
The next proposals, likewise, seek to incentivize innovation in the 
United States, but by reforming procedural aspects of patent litigation. 
B. Procedural Reforms to Patent Law 
From a procedural context, our research found that the multilayered 
and time-consuming nature of U.S. patent litigation creates an expensive 
process that firms have sought to avoid by inventing abroad. This finding 
indicates that the procedural nature of U.S. patent litigation should be 
modified to minimize these costs. 
Patent litigation is fundamentally no different than any other litigation; 
most cases settle and, by applying basic economic theory, we can predict 
                                                     
215. See supra Section I.B (explaining that patent rights can vary in strength, offering inventors 
differing levels of control over their patented devices). 
216. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2018) (stating the research use of another drug is not an act of 
infringement if it is “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the . . . use . . . of drugs”). 
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at which point they settle and for how much. The noted flaw is the lack of 
mechanisms to ensure settlements are tethered to the value of the patent; 
the reality is that, in many cases, parties settle at dollar amounts reflecting 
the greater costs of litigating the dispute. We propose two remedies for 
this issue. First, understanding the maxim that one cannot infringe an 
invalid patent, the validity of the challenged patent should be tested early 
in litigation before the parties incur the full costs of discovery and trial. 
Second, the structure of patent litigation should inform both parties of 
their chances of success as well as the amount at risk during litigation’s 
early stages, again, to encourage settlements before greater costs are 
incurred. Each of the following procedural steps would reduce litigation 
expenses without undermining the integrity of the process, remedying 
perhaps the primary disincentive of inventing in the United States. 
1. Determining Patent Validity Through Phased Litigation Can 
Reduce Litigation Costs and Increase Innovation 
U.S. patent litigation should separate the question of whether a patent 
is valid from whether it was infringed into bifurcated hearings. Where 
validity lies at the crux of a patent dispute, an abbreviated procedure to 
resolve this issue could eliminate most discovery and trial costs if the 
patent is found to be invalid. We propose capturing the spirit of the highly 
popular German bifurcated model by instituting a modest yet significant 
enhancement of the Inter Partes Review (IPR) system recently enacted by 
the U.S. Congress.217 
In comparison to the United States, the Federal Patent Court in 
Germany (the Bundespatentgericht) offers an efficient model to resolve 
validity claims as a gatekeeper to extended litigation.218 Typically in 
Germany, after a plaintiff initiates an infringement lawsuit, the defendant 
can claim the plaintiff’s patent is invalid, oftentimes prompting the trial 
court to stay the proceedings until validity is determined in a separate 
hearing.219 By trying validity in an initial stage, commentators note that 
bifurcation eliminates the full costs of discovery and trial if the patent was 
improvidently granted.220 Or in instances the patent’s validity is 
established, such a determination can encourage settlement or defer the 
                                                     
217. Stuart J.H. Graham & Nicolas Van Zeebroeck, Comparing Patent Litigation Across Europe: 
A First Look, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 655, 670–71 (2014). 
218. Id. 
219. See id. at 671–72. 
220. Charleen Fei, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied? The Principle of Bifurcation in the German 
Patent Litigation System, 14 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 619, 638 (2014) (discussing 
the efficiency of the bifurcating patent litigation in the German context). 
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remaining expenses until the subsequent stage.221 As a result, defending 
an infringement claim in Germany costs far below the United States: 
50,000–250,000 euros in Germany compared to roughly three million 
dollars in the United States.222 
A reasonable approach to achieve the savings and benefits of a 
bifurcated model would entail creating a limited mandatory stay at the 
district court level if a defendant timely challenges validity of a patent in 
dispute before the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). The 
PTAB operates IPR, which the U.S. Congress enacted in 2011 to offer 
litigants a separate and more efficient venue to challenge a patent’s 
validity.223 In the typical hearing, the petitioner presents evidence to a 
three-person PTAB panel suggesting the art is obvious, not novel, or for 
some other reason, not patentable.224 Due to the benefits of testing validity 
at the onset of litigation, some American courts routinely grant stays of 
litigation pending IPR. In doing so, these courts create a more efficient 
judicial economy, which litigants enjoy as well.225 
We argue that the manner in which IPR has been used to de facto 
bifurcate validity and infringement should become the uniform American 
approach. Although IPR can potentially add an additional step and costs 
to the greater litigation process, scholars contend that only colorable 
disputes have so far tended to go to IPR, for all litigants involved have 
incentives to avoid such additional costs.226 And by making validity a 
gatekeeper to litigation (if validity is in question), not only could 
defendants more efficiently dispatch infringement lawsuits, but also bad 
faith litigants would also be less likely to initiate them in the first place.227 
                                                     
221. See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 
120 (2013) (noting that the system “put[s] off many costs associated only with infringement 
litigation–including particularly expensive costs like infringement experts and discovery about the 
defendant’s product–until the second phase”). 
222. See Graham & Van Zeebroeck, supra note 217, at 667. 
223. W. Michael Schuster, Invalidity Assertion Entities and Inter Partes Review: Rent Seeking as 
a Tool to Discourage Patent Trolls, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1163, 1166–67 (2017). 
224. See id. at 1169 (explaining the nature of IPR). 
225. See, e.g., Stan Gibson, District Court Stays Litigation Pending Inter Partes Review (“IPR”) 
Over Defendant’s Objection that Summary Judgment Motion Should Be Determined First, PATENT 
LAW. BLOG (Sept. 13, 2016), https://patentlaw.jmbm.com/2016/09/district-court-stays-litigatio.html 
[https://perma.cc/8J64-9TFV] (describing how the court granted a stay to resolve validity issues). 
226. Schuster, supra note 223, at 1181 (arguing that the costs of IPR is likely to incentivize parties 
to challenge primarily bad patents). 
227. Consider that bad faith litigants are able to exert pressure on practicing entities to settle even 
meritless infringement lawsuits because the high costs of litigation increase the economic rationality 
of settling without a trial—despite the merits of the allegations. Notably, under the current framework, 
the strength of the nuisance plaintiff’s patent tends to be irrelevant because parties must generally 
incur the full costs of litigation to contest the patent’s validity. If validity could be tested quickly and 
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Creating a limited mandatory stay on district court proceedings is a 
realistic improvement on the current system that also enjoys the noted 
benefits of the German bifurcated system, but without significantly 
delaying patentees from pursuing an infringement claim.228 
2. Promoting Efficiency and Innovation by Informing Litigants of 
Risks and Exposure 
We also propose cutting the procedural costs of litigation by 
implementing mechanisms to promote information sharing during the 
early stages of patent litigation. There are a few district courts that, as a 
response to the growing number of infringement lawsuits, have adopted 
local rules meant to disclose infringement and validity theories at the 
onset of litigation. The benefit of disseminating information is that 
litigants can better measure their liability risk and, by increasing shared 
knowledge, narrow the gaps between their bargaining stances.229 Not only 
should this promote out of court settlements but also help those 
settlements to reflect the underlying patent’s value rather than the cost of 
litigation. 
In 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 
(E.D. of Texas) enacted a prominent example of such a procedure in the 
form of an alternate case management schedule called “Track B.”230 Track 
B is designed to front-load certain issues in patent disputes, especially 
damages and theories of infringement.231 For example, within fourteen 
days of filing the case, the plaintiff must, in addition to making a “good 
                                                     
cheaply, then bad faith litigants would be substantially less able to pressure practicing entities using 
a bad patent. This would not only reduce the rate of meritless litigation but also increase the rationality 
of contesting flawed lawsuits. 
228. That said, instituting this approach without the STRONGER Patents Act of 2017 changes is 
not suggested as the current PTAB proceedings do not maintain the presumption of validity given to 
the patentee in district court proceedings. Gene Quinn, Federal Circuit OKs PTAB Invalidating Patent 
Claims Prior Litigation Confirmed as Valid, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2017), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/04/04/federal-circuit-oks-ptab-invalidating-patent-claims-prior-
litigation-confirmed-as-valid/id=81796/ [https://perma.cc/2JYF-FXB4] (noting that PTAB does not 
assume validity). 
229. Basic bargaining theory indicates that incremental increases of information create a mutual 
understanding among parties regarding costs and risks, making them more likely to resolve their 
dispute without suffering the greater costs of litigating. See John Yoo, Rational Treaties: Article II, 
Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 30 
(2011) (explaining the importance of information to settlements within bargaining theory). 
230. General Order Regarding Track B Initial Patent Case Management Order, General Order 14-
3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/goFiles/14-03.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4648-JBPB]. 
231. Id. 
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faith estimate” of expected damages, disclose “all licenses or settlement 
agreements concerning the patents-in-suit,” both of which are reliable 
predictors of the damages a court is likely to award upon finding 
infringement.232 Furthermore, the order limits aspects of discovery, 
including interrogatories and requests for production.233 Similar to the 
E.D. of Texas’s Track B schedule, in January 2017, the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of California (N.D. California) amended its local 
patent rules requiring litigants to disclose damages both early and often.234 
Such disclosures should not only help litigants to understand their 
exposure to liability, but also guide the court’s oversight of discovery 
proportionality.235 
We propose incorporating into the uniform set of patent rules 
N.D. California’s manner of disclosing damages. Although E.D. Texas’s 
Track B has, as an optional litigation route, found success providing 
parties—with typically less at risk—an ambitious fourteen-day schedule 
to disclose damages and infringement theories, this framework is much 
less realistic for complex patent litigants. As a required procedure for all 
patent litigants, we advocate in favor of replicating N.D. California’s local 
rules, which mandate patent litigants to disclose and explain “non-
binding, good faith estimates” during the initial case management 
conference; then within fourteen days of that conference, the plaintiff 
must disclose theories regarding the nature of the alleged infringement, as 
well as prior licenses of the patent.236 After making these critical 
disclosures at the beginning of litigation, the plaintiff must announce her 
expected damages along with “factual support for those theories” within 
fifty days of receiving invalidity contentions.237 This accelerated yet 
reasonable procedure should assist litigants in making efficient and 
informed decisions during the early stages about whether to incur 
elongated litigation, encouraging settlements. And by reducing the costs 
of litigation, we expect settlements to better reflect the value of the 
challenged patent as opposed to the greater costs of litigation. More 
                                                     
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. See N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 2-1(b)(5), 3-2(h)–(i), 3-4(c)–(e), 3-8, 3-9. 
235. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) and advisory committee’s notes to the 2015 amendment 
(“Information is discoverable under revised Rule 26(b)(1) if it is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense and is proportional to the needs of the case.”). 
236. N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 2-1(b)(5), 3-2(h)–(i), 3-4(c)–(e), 3-8, 3-9; Robert F. McCauley III & 
Jacob A. Schroeder, Revised Patent Local Rules for the Northern District of California, FINNEGAN 
(Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.finnegan.com/ipupdates/pubdetail.aspx?pub=b835a596-8be3-4d35-8458-
29ac267713a7 [https://perma.cc/F3HC-X5WA]. 
237. N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 2-1(b)(5), 3-9. 
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importantly, promoting greater procedural efficiencies should help to 
revive the incentives to innovate in the United States. 
C. Non-Practicing Entities 
The foregoing proposals to amend substantive and procedural aspects 
of patent litigation may have the added benefit of increasing the efficacy 
of NPEs. Currently, NPEs have incentives to indiscriminately threaten 
infringement lawsuits against practicing entities because the extraordinary 
costs of defending an infringement claim in the United States makes it 
rational for most defendant-patentees to settle without litigating; as a 
result, scholarship has tended to portray NPEs as parasitic litigants.238 We 
argue, however, that NPEs could improve the efficiency of patent 
enforcement if they exclusively sought out and challenged bad patents. 
The patent system renders substantial costs on the public and markets 
because each patent removes technology from the public domain.239 
Although this system is thought necessary to promote innovation, scholars 
contend that improperly granted, or “bad,” patents increase the 
anticommons without an attendant justification.240 But if the cost of 
litigating a patent claim were reduced, then practicing entities would be 
more likely to defend valid patents against meritless lawsuits rather than 
settling. In this situation, NPEs would become more likely to seek out 
practicing entities enforcing bad patents because those parties would be 
more likely to settle than to have a court declare their patents invalid. In 
doing so, NPEs could assume a socially beneficial role of ferreting out 
bad patents and trimming the anticommons. And by lessening the rate of 
meritless lawsuits, innovation in the United States is likely to increase. 
D. Understanding Why Firms Leave and Where They Go 
In terms of implications, we are left with an especially salient question: 
Are patent laws the reason why innovative firms are leaving the United 
States? Although we may confidently conclude that firms are likely to 
place their R&D and innovation in countries where patent enforcement 
                                                     
238. See generally Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and 
Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583 (2009) (discussing the perceived problems with 
NPEs, pejoratively described as “patent trolls”). 
239. Anna B. Laakmann, The New Genomic Semicommons, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1001, 1023 
(2015) (explaining the costs imposed by patent based anticommons). 
240. W. Michael Schuster, Rent-Seeking and Inter Partes Review: An Analysis of Invalidity 
Assertion Entities in Patent Law, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 271, 280–81 (2016) (noting 
that bad patents increase litigation costs which are imposed on consumers and also harm the efficacy 
of markets). 
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imposes fewer costs, we question whether patent laws are the root of why 
innovative firms are leaving the United States, or whether U.S. patent law 
is a negative factor considered by transient firms searching for a place to 
invent. Indeed, because the decision of where to go is different than the 
decision of whether to leave, it is critical to understand the impetus of why 
firms offshore their R&D. 
A firm that chooses to innovate abroad accepts a substantial transaction 
cost, especially when the company must uproot its current operations. 
Accordingly, firms are likely biased towards staying local unless 
compelling reasons persuade them to relocate internationally. Although 
the foregoing analysis provides insights into which factors are salient in 
choosing an R&D home, it does not necessarily follow that all of these 
same factors drive the decision of whether to leave. In other words, firms 
searching for a place to innovate may be drawn to countries offering less 
expensive patent enforcement regimes even though few, if any, 
companies actually decide to leave because of their current patent 
regime’s costs and risks. 
Finding an answer to this question is imperative. It would provide 
insights into the strategic behavior of firms concerning the reasons why 
they offshore the most valuable qualities of the innovative process. This 
inquiry would also uncover strategies to increase the ability of U.S. patent 
law to incentivize and retain innovation. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing research provides some of the first evidence that the U.S. 
patent system is losing innovation to foreign jurisdictions due to the costly 
nature of patent enforcement and litigation in the United States. This trend 
suggests that, despite the territorial nature of patent law, inventors are 
strategic actors who offshore aspects of the innovation process to lessen 
the costs of developing technology. It also indicates that the literature has 
overly emphasized the role of patent protection as the primary catalyst of 
innovation, ignoring the critical role of patent enforcement. After all, 
firms have little ability to strengthen their patent protection but are instead 
tethered to the patent laws of whatever countries they seek protection 
despite where a good was researched or manufactured. However, firms 
can mitigate substantial costs by physically developing devices and 
methods in countries that offer more efficient and less expensive patent 
litigation schemes. This is problematic for the United States, which 
subjects inventors in the actual R&D process to the highest costs of 
litigation and damages awards in the world. Predictably, the result of this 
landscape is an exodus of innovation from the United States. 
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Our proposals offer practical solutions to this problem. We argue that 
U.S. patent law could unburden the actual R&D process by expanding the 
experimental use exception as well as better staging patent litigation. As 
for the first solution, creating an improved safe harbor for good faith 
inventors endeavoring to promote patent law’s utilitarian goals without 
undermining the system’s incentive to innovate would encourage firms to 
conduct research in the United States. Concerning procedural changes, we 
propose emphasizing IPR and Track B modifications to increase 
information sharing, encourage settlement of cases, and expeditiously 
resolve critical questions, all of which lower the costs of discovery and 
trial without undermining the quality of patent litigation. 
 
